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# **A CRITIQUE OF NICOLAI HARTMANN'S ETHICS**

**BY**

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## I

### INTRODUCTION

Each cultural epoch brings its own contribution to the sum of human thought. The historian of the future will find the specific contribution of our age in its explicit recognition of the problem of value. The concept of value has begun to dominate philosophy. In the words of Windleband, 'We do not now so much expect from philosophy that which it was formerly supposed to give, a theoretic scheme of the world, a synthesis of the results of the separate sciences or transcending them on lines of its own, a scheme harmoniously complete in itself. What we expect from philosophy to-day is a reflection on those permanent values which have their foundation in a higher spiritual reality above the changing interest of our times' (*Introduction to Philosophy*). A theory of value, as Osborne put it, 'is no less a necessary part of the equipment of every competent philosophy than epistemology' (*Foundations of the Philosophy of Value*, p. 1). Again, as he observes 'a complete system of philosophy must ultimately be a philosophy of value' (*Foundations of the Philosophy of Value*, p. 22). We are indebted to Kant's philosophy for the independence of the problem of value apart from that of knowledge. He taught us the distinction between 'valuation' and 'explanation'. The problem of existence belongs to the sphere of science and that of value to philosophy proper. When we put the question 'is there anything valuable?', science says 'No'. The ancients believed that the earth was the centre of the world and man its favoured child. Copernicus and Darwin changed all that. To-day, science tells us that we are accidental and precarious tenants of a nobody's estate and that nature is blind to our dreams. Our literature is full of pity for man, of declamations, bitter and pathetic, and mostly resigned on the theme. J. S. Mill in his three essays on religion and Bertrand Russell in his 'Freeman's Worship' awakened us to a sense of our plight here. To Mill, nature is an enemy of man, against whom we are at



war. And that is why Huxley regarded morality as a deliberate counter-move against the cosmic process. There is nothing here or hereafter except, to use a phrase of Russel, 'omnipotent matter', 'blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction' We are in a field of irresistible forces that tolerate for a moment 'man's vagaries'. Thought and consciousness, if they make any contribution at all, make one that is small beyond reckoning. Some eminent Physicists have even concluded that the universe is slowly running down like a clock and that the energies of our systems will decay soon leaving the glory of the human race a dismal disturbance in the primeval solitude. If the ultimate fate of the world is sealed in advance, Gods are doomed along with men. Michael Angelo, Shakespeare and Shaw, share the same fate and go down into the same bottomless pit as the sun and the moon. This is the new 'Gotterdammerung' of which Spengler speaks, perhaps, the twilight of our race.

#### SCIENTIFIC OUTLOOK AND ETHICAL RELATIVISM

The resulting outlook of this view for Ethics is disastrous as it cuts the very nerve of all valuable life. There are no values or morals, no good or bad except that thinking makes it so. The vices of one age are the values of another. The ideals of one school are the prohibitions of its opposite. When religions conflict and morals change, Ethics differs from man to man. Then, what is Truth? It is only that which is useful. What is Beauty? It is only that which lures our senses for a while. What is Good? It is only a code of prescriptions that the law imposes to govern large groups, who, if left to themselves, would like to undo all the laws that they publicly follow. Values are a vague projection of hope on the screen of the objective world. In short, science reduces values to mere means of personal gratification.

Then where is the question of certitude in ethics? In the congeries of ethical propositions, where is an axiomatic and self-evident truth? To use the language of Westermarck, 'the great diversity of opinion among moral specialists only shows that none of the various theories of normative sciences can be said to have proved its case' (*Ethical Relativism*, p. 44). Relativism tells us that none of the moral judgments possesses objective validity; there is nothing truly good or bad, right or

wrong Moral principles express nothing more than the opinions of those who believe in them. The moral concepts which form the basis of moral predication, are ultimately generalisations of tendencies to feel either moral approval or disapproval with reference to acts (*Ethical Relativism*, p 90). In a moment of great revolutionary zeal, Lenin expressed the view that morality is a deception. 'In our opinion morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of the class war, everything is moral which is necessary for the annihilation of the old exploiting social order for the unity of the proletariat Our morality thus consists solely in discipline and in conscious war against the exploiters. We do not believe in eternal principles of morality and we will expose this deception Communist morality is identical with the fight for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat' (*The Communist Manifesto*). The view is technically called ethical scepticism and derives its plausibility from the fact, that the world presents to most of us an untidy litter of things rather than a fine and peaceful garden of Epicurus, where we can live, love and laugh as we please.

#### THE LIMITS SCIENCE MUST ACCEPT

In all ages of scientific advance, there is a swing from Protagoras to Plato. The truths of yesterday are found wanting to-day We are expanding in our ranges and our loyalties are widening The picture that science drew is overdone It only exhorted us to be bold and watch the last expiring pulse of the universe. But, all the historical religions and idealistic philosophies of the world have recorded their permanent protest against this blank-cheque-view of life. Its policy of clean-sweep strikes at the root of all problems of value by an unwillingness to see through to the end Life is a persistent challenge, it demands an explanation Now, the circle has run its full course and with a new turn, we are brought back to an era of sober questionings. Relativism and scepticism move from misunderstanding to misunderstanding and end by being misunderstood. The ideal of physical science is a system of logical sequences called cause and effect. It is an abstract scheme which precludes much that philosophy is obliged to include. Values pass out of its picture. The status of life and its meaning in the

world is the standing problem of philosophy and ethics. Science leaves us with the notion of an activity in which nothing is done. It is a mere formula for succession. It finds no individuality in nature, aim or goal in it. Dealing with rules of succession, it faces only one-half of the evidence deposited by our entire experience. Whether the world is born on a tortoise which in turn is carried by an elephant 'with legs reaching all the way down' or is the thought of a 'Jeans-like-God whose symbol is the square root of minus one' is not the question of questions. We are concerned with things which embrace the great dramatic and historical happenings that have shaped the destiny and direction of the human beings. What is meant by humanity and what is meant by the 'ought'? These are the questions that really matter to us. The 'ought' is a fact which mere fact cannot explain. Nor is it created or imagined by the human mind. Dealing with the daily life of human beings, now and ahead, in space and time of ordinary experience, its claims are enormous. The 'ought' is the official seal of values and enters into all the human actions and motives. In effect, values seem to be all and nothing less. The moral man who places his life at the call of duty, the artist who creates the perfect form and the prophet who provokes the people for their own good, are only moved by the force of an intangible metaphysical essence we call values. It is, then, not at all an accident that when we contemplate greatest events, the revolutions that have changed the face of the world, the rise of religions, the miracles of man's conquests over nature, we are drawn deep into the eternal human element that runs through the pulse of human history giving moment and meaning to it. When the full tale of our history comes to be told, it will be estimated as an adventure in the realm of values.

#### FAILURE ALL AROUND AND THE REVOLT AGAINST PESSIMISM

Pessimism is the 'forma mentis' of the age. We are getting vexed with its disintegrating trend. Science scandalises the purpose of life and casts us adrift on the waves of probability. We are tired of being told that we count for nothing and that the world is on the down-grade. The fashionable philosophies of the day are the creations of novelists and second-rate journalists that have turned pathological through an acute economic

crisis that needs a more dignified handling. It is a return to cynicism through the literature of Freud. Disillusionment, however manfully held at arm's length, devitalises life and kills the zest for living. In all paths of life, to-day, there is a persistent undertone of pessimism and defeatism. Science has been brought up short by its own success and ruthlessness. The knowledge which it gives us is not of values but of patterns drawn on the surface of the unknown. The world-view of an Aldous Huxley is the symptom of a new decadence that should be arrested in its spread. If science is to enrich human life, it must not intrude on the sphere of values. The balance of the forces that make for the good life must be kept going. The value-philosophy of to-day stands opposed to, and is a reaction against, scepticism, relativism, naturalism and pragmatism in ethics. As Prof. Julian Huxley put it 'Science is without a scale of values: the only value it recognizes is the value of truth and knowledge. This neutrality of science in regard to emotions and moral and aesthetic values means that, while in its own sphere of knowledge it is supreme, in other spheres it is only a method or a tool. What man shall do with the new facts, the new ideas, the new opportunities of control which science is showering upon him does not depend upon science, but upon what man wants to do with them; and this in turn depends upon his scale of values' (*Science and Religion*—Broadcast lectures by various thinkers, p. 18). Modern science and the ethics of economic *Laissez faire* have conducted us into a world, in which, there are more sellers than buyers, doctors than patients, lawyers than clients, and above all more policemen and soldiers in uniform than dangerous citizens. The theatre is actually overrun by disruptive malcontents curious to know the happenings at the next corner. We need a large outlook, which at once does justice to the many paradoxes of the age beginning with poverty on one side and plenty on another and ending with the swing between dictatorship and democracy. We are perplexed, fascinated and repelled by this astounding medley of civilization and brutality, magnificence and meanness.

#### THEOLOGY OUT OF DATE

Can God help us in this situation? The post-war generation seems to have substituted values in the place of God. At any

rate, one section of the value-philosophers are in no way friendly to him. The Great War evoked great reactions. While it convinced one section of thinkers of the existence of God, it once for all weakened such a thing in others. While the Bishops prayed in churches, God did not choose to enlighten them. Hence, many thinkers turned to a world in which they thought there could be meaning, even though God is absent from it. When authority fails to appeal, Theology becomes a subject of pure joke. The ethics of values has come in at this juncture to play the new religion abandoning the old pose. Values are the corner-stone of the new structure. The real world, to use the modern phrase, is a 'Kingdom of values'. There is an intrinsic or absolute order of values different from sensuous existence constituting a self-governing colony of essences. In a word, there is no need even for God, provided values are recognised, not as mere self-expressions of individual or collective emotions, but, as relating to a permanent feature of reality. The kingdom of values opens up afresh the 'Socratic Pathos of wonder'. It is a new philosophy thought out afresh in the light of our new experience. These ultimate and eternal values are Platonic essences and are not merely attributes of God. They are the citizens of an eternal world, a spaceless sphere of pure essences (Cf. Santayana's *Realm of Essence*). In the new ethics, in the apprehension of these eternal values and in the earnest striving to co-operate with the moral world, lies the whole duty of man. This, perhaps, is the only part by which the moralist can claim his status in the eternal world. If the heart of religion is the source of peace it finds in the love of God, the secret of the new ethics is the security it seeks in the Kingdom of values, in the midst of the disquietude of the world. The value-philosophy of Hartmann is purely based on phenomenological experience and follows the logic of realism. It has not much in common with the 'philosophia perennis' or the Great Tradition, which Urban regards as the 'natural metaphysics of the human mind and the authentic point of view'. Value and reality in the philosophy of realism are not inseparably connected. Hartmann has nothing to do with the problem of divine immanence. The recognition of truth, beauty and goodness, need not prove that there is a God. God, to the new ethics, need not in his transcendent being be the source and origin of

all perfection. Nor does it approve of the concept of a 'super ego' in the ultra-personal will as the support of values (Munsterberg, *Eternal Values*, p 385). In the ethics of Hartmann values are puny Gods brooking no sovereign or super-deity. They constitute a pantheon of immaterial essences. In a word, Hartmann offers you pure Platonism minus its traditional moral hierarchy and cosmology with the bottom knocked out of its theistic bearings.

### THE LION IN THE PATH OF MODERN RESEARCH

The value theories of the century are the off-shoots of Platonic realism. They preserve, in some shape or other, his tradition, through all their modern re-statements. The whole line of German speculation, in this regard, is thoroughly influenced by the remarkable researches of Husserl in his *Phenomenology*, a movement directed against the Kantian tradition on one side and Eudaemonism on the other. The German ethics of values avails itself of the results already obtained in the field by Hartmann's notable predecessors. Meinong and Scheler are its forerunners. Modern ethics is a swing to and fro, between Eudaemonism and Kantian ethics. Eudaemonism bases its findings on empirical data. The speculations loyal to the Kantian tradition reject the same, in favour of a formalistic ethics on a priori principles for the sake of self-consistency. The theories which claim absolute validity for ethical principles are void of content and are merely formal and rationalistic. They fail to bring out the rich substance of ethical life. Emotional theories which discover moral value in material content and not in the empty form of the will, lack unquestionable footing. As such, they are prone to relativism and subjectivism. They derive value of the act from the end that they seek to attain, which is always a state of feeling. If that be the case, no external object has value, except in relation to sensitive organisms. In a word, ethics must be saved from the dilemma of an a priori, but purely formal and empty abstraction, and a concrete and empirical but merely relativistic theory. This is the difficulty that modern ethics has to face.

### AXIOLOGICAL ETHICS

Axiological ethics tries to amend the drawbacks of both by making a philosophical defence of the objectivity of moral

values. The phenomenological discovery of a 'material a priori' overcomes the opposition by furnishing a theory of objective value, which is at the same time material. The false opposition between thought and sense perception set up by Kant is the mother of many errors. As a result of this dualism, perception, feeling and volition have been ascribed to sense dependent on the organism. Scheler and Husserl unearthed the prejudices involved in all subjective theories. Husserl held that these are 'alogical' aspects of consciousness which display an order of relations which is presupposed by an inductively established order. It is not borrowed from logical thought. Augustine and Pascal were the first to discover the idea of an ethics of feeling that is at the same time absolute and a priori. Hartmann took the cue from them and announced that there are other modes of experience which reveal realms of being to which pure intellect is as blind as the ear to colour or the nose to sight. The realm of value belongs to such an objective order, going towards the making up of a whole by itself. It is a separate sphere of being with its own laws and structures as absolute as those of mathematics or logic, apprehensible with the same degree of intuitive certainty. Ethics conceived as a general science of value should take up the task of exploring this domain. And it is this investigation the new ethics of values opens up.

#### EUDAEMONISM AND AXIOLOGY

Axiology is seeking the empirical basis for the value science of ethics. Eudaemonism has already preempted the principal items of such an empirical basis. Axiological ethics puts the theory of value on the basis of ethical judgment by pointing out that mere empirical experience is inadequate to understand the ethical phenomena. Eudaemonism makes goods as such, or the experience of enjoying the goods, the ultimate determinant of ethical predication. Value ethics holds that a genuine knowledge of values is given to us in some of our emotional experiences and that a choice or predication is right which squares with the value insight. The true values revealed in our emotional experience are of such a nature that we do not seem to be guided always by pleasure *per se*. Eudaemonism lacks the higher vision. It can never discover a

good which is not pleasant or a sorrow that is sweet and soulful. Value ethics declares that we attempt to realise or actualise higher values irrespective of their pleasing us. Such a proposition is a flat contradiction in Eudaemonism. Axiological ethics is based on plurality and subjectivity. Emotional experience reveals values possessing a normative force. The ethical judgments issuing from it transcend the immediacy of the emotion and put the agent in touch with an objective order that perdures side by side with the existential world. Value research has to meet another difficulty in making a claim of this sort. On one side, it has to face the task of expanding the range of empirical data on which it constructs, and on the other, it has to discover a unity within this data. Again, the unity sought for should not be a formalistic one imprinted by an ordering mind, but should be a unity that can stand up to scientific verifiability. In a word, the methods of the new research must conform to the spirit of the sciences.

#### AXIOLOGICAL ETHICS AND THE KANTIAN TRADITION

Though Hartmann keeps close to empirical fact, he has obvious leanings to rationalism. He insists that ethical valuations are a priori and this a priori he regards as empirical also. Though he is loyal to the main lines of Kantian tradition, he puts aside all duty ethics. Ethics is not casuistry to play the guide in particular situations. It does not pretend to tell you what to do in any given instance, any more than epistemology can tell what is true or false in a particular case. They only give us criteria of good and bad or truth and falsehood. The application of this criterion is in each case a minor problem. Instead of making the categorical imperative the main spring of value ethics, Hartmann makes ethics the general knowledge and pursuit of values. This viewpoint naturally leads him into a trenchant critique of the Kantian tradition. Kant regarded the moral law as a priori. To him, it was a subjectivistic and rationalistic product. Hartmann rejects Kant's conception of the a priori and refuses to recognise the dichotomy between the a priori and the a posteriori. The Kantian antithesis between the a priori and the a posteriori is not the same as that between nature and reason (vol. 1, p. 60). Again, the Kantian categorical imperative is not an empty and



barren formalism, but is the ideal objective relationship, of which ethical consciousness gets glimpses regardless of its form (vol. 1, p. 95). Applying Husserl's doctrine of an objective a priori to value, Scheler worked up a theory of ethical standards that are supposed to be at once concrete and absolute. Formalism can be made significant only by a profusion of axiological content. In ethics, transcendental subjectivism does not lead to the freedom of the will for the sake of which Kant introduced it (vol. 1, p. 159). On the other hand it throws a whole cloud of suspicion on the will itself. Kantian subjectivism lies wholly in his conception of the a priori. He was unable to see an a priori which did not subsist in the subject as a function. 'But, must the subject add anything out of himself?' asks Hartmann and maintains that the content of what the subject discerns a priori is just as objective as what he perceives a posteriori. That the a prioristic contents are not to be extracted from the empirical manifold cannot in any way call in question their objectivity. Geometrical propositions cannot indeed be derived from objects or things, not even from drawn figures. They are none the less objective and have nothing to do with the functions of consciousness. So also is the relation between cause and effect which is never given to sense. Then, how can the categorical imperative be otherwise? It is, says Hartmann, also something purely objective and its content is an ideal objective relation which precisely as such hovers before the moral consciousness, independently of the degree of actualisation in real life. To confuse the empirical with the objective is an idealistic prejudice. This led to the nineteenth century subjectivism which submerged the whole sphere of ideal objects, long ago discovered by Plato. The universality, a priority and the categorical character of the principle has no need of a subjectivistic genesis. The moral consciousness meets the sensible world with another principle leading us to a self-existent ideal realm to which values are native. The ethical philosophy of the nineteenth century spent itself in an analysis of the moral consciousness and its acts. It was far from concerning itself about the objective contents of moral claims, commandments and values. Only in our day a new turning-point of the ethical problem has come to light. The supreme concern of the new phase is the 'substance of ethical being and

not-being'. The investigation of this is the task of the 'Phenomenology of morals' (vol. 1, chap. xiii, pp. 176-80).

#### THE TECHNIQUE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE VALUE-ETHICS

The method of a research is of greater worth than its results. A scientific ethics has been a dream from Plato's time. Till now no momentous step in the direction was taken. Brentano, Scheler and Ehrenfels have essayed this critical task following the lead of Husserl. The method is all important. Though the Newtonian physics gave way before the more recent researches, even to-day it is admitted that no one has gone beyond his methods. The basic step in the Methodology of natural science is the survey of empirical data. You have to discover by accurate observation and analysis the unity in the same and then devise adequate methods for testing the validity of these unifying theories. The problem of ethics, as Brentano insisted, is not to make it 'autonomous' but to make it 'orthonomic'. In insisting on this feature of ethics (freedom from error) he has indicated the direction which axiological ethics is destined to take. The method that Scheler and Hartmann followed is technically known as the 'phenomenological method'. The method seeks to describe and grasp the full meaning of the contents of experience itself (Husserl's *Ideas*, pp. 7-12, 30, 41-9). For this method, the most complex psychological data, sensations, judgments, inferences, feelings and emotions may be 'simple', if included in one act of awareness, even though they have different time differences and are interrupted by other events. Thus, a friend, an injury received, are all suggested as examples of phenomena forming unities of experience determining actions or attitudes. Husserl claims to have undertaken a non-empirical investigation of knowledge, and in special, of the structure of the act of knowing with its content, exclusive of reference either to the subject or to the objects of knowledge as real existence, both of which, to borrow his phrase are 'bracketed'. The phenomenon which is the object of investigation is not an existent but only an essence (Husserl's *Ideas*, pp. 12-30, 41-9). His concern is only with the a priori character of act and content. Scheler followed this method in ethics and exhibited the phenomenological basis of ethics without hazarding a closed system of ethical science

bearing on concrete life (Mary Evelyn Clerk's *Essay on Phenomenological Ethics*, *Journal of Philosophy*, p 144, 1932). He claims not to have transcended the range of strictly a priori concepts and relations. The Phenomenological import of these a priori contents is much more than formal. The denial of the formal character of a principle does not mean that it is empirical. Kant held that the opposition of a priori and empirical coincides with that of formal and material, but this is wrong. As Hartmann says, what is formal in one relation would be material in another. Material a priori truths are of utmost importance for ethics. Kant failed, as an ethical thinker, since he could not recognise the existence of material a priori truths.

Then what is a priori? Scheler defines as a priori 'those general meanings and propositions that can be directly apprehended without any assumptions as to the apprehending subject or its nature as a living being or as to the objects to which they may be applicable—thus, without any presuppositions concerning existence' (Mary Evelyn Clerk's *Essay*, *Journal of Philosophy*, p 444, 1932). The opposition between real and unreal does not hold good here. If we call them phenomena, it has no reference to appearance. The apprehension of objects is the intuition of essence' or 'Phenomenological experience'. Essences as such are neither universal nor particular (Cf. Santayana's *Realm of Essence*). Only as applied to existents does their significance become manifest. An identical essence may be embodied in a number of individual objects, but there are also individual essences. Thus, a priori knowledge is derived from experience based on facts and facts only and can never be the product of arbitrary intellectual construction. But, our experience of it is a pure intuition of the essence, a sensing of the self-evident without any mediation. As such, it can never be endorsed or discredited by observation or inductive proof. And indeed, such processes always presuppose it. Experience is no chaos of sensuous material, upon which the mind puts the form and orders it to unity. Notions like thinghood, power, quality, motion, space, time, number are no more creations of thought than data of sense. Pure sensations are nowhere given. Essences and relations of essences are as much given as things or goods. This view of a priori is totally rid

of all subjectivistic prejudices which beset the Kantian ethics. The Kantian effort to vindicate its objectivity through its claim to necessity and universality is futile. Necessity is a negative criterion. An a priori judgement may be simply singular and need not be universal at all. This means that it need not necessarily be recognised as valid by one and all. Only one mind and only one race and not another may be capable of reaching such insight. Thus, it is clear, that our whole mental activity and not merely its rational aspect is subject to laws that are independent of and logically prior to its psychological organization and surroundings. Feeling, emotion, volition have an a priori content never derived from thought. Values are as much essences as objects of mathematical thinking. They exhibit a structure that can be intuited as a phenomenon as directly as an a priori of logic. But the valuational a priori is not given directly to thought but is given only to feeling as in our preferences in love or hate. The organ of value is not rational judgement which is only a subsequent act, but immediate valuational feeling. A purely intellectual mind may lose the intuition of value. Plato's 'Meno' gives us the clue to the knowledge of ethics. We seize hold on the ethical through 'recollection'. The seer with moral vision puts us into direct touch with our own moral nature by unveiling our moral capacity (vol. 1, p. 58). Scheler had failed to unlock the 'Rich plenitude of the ethical cosmos'. With Nietzsche the same 'melted away into ethical relativism'. Firmly guarded against any such dangers by the phenomenological methods of his predecessors, Hartmann explores afresh the field of values, a preliminary effort at which was already made by Aristotle's 'Nicomachean Ethics'.

The burden of the new Ethics is solely on the a priori. Moral experience and a prioristic insight are inter-related. The a priori is never ready to hand but must be guided, aroused and stirred to activity by objective facts. Yet, none of these facts would be ethical but for the values that are at the back of them. These can be discerned only a priori in the context of experience. The values are apprehended in and through phenomena. They are in our experience but not of it. Valuational vision being a prioristic, apart from it, ethical life would have no meaning. All ethical science rests upon the a prioristic

insight, the primary consciousness, through which alone we know good and evil. 'Here enters a knowledge sui generis, with its own laws, and its immediacy, an a prioristic intuition which is independent of the posterius of actual phenomena and the part they play as guides' (vol 1, p 104) It is an a priori order of the emotions and feelings like love and hate in entire independence of the logic of the intellect. This primal order of perception is the 'Ordre du coeur' of which Pascal spoke (vol 1, p. 177) The full significance of Hartmann's work can be understood only when we come to appreciate the fresh perspective that the new method affords. Realistic to the core, it remains close to its Platonic background. In opening up the new path, Hartmann has given a decisive turn to the ethical science by discovering afresh the inherent unity of ancient and modern ethics It is one of his considered convictions that the ethical man must be nothing short of a seer, alive to the fulness of the values of life (vol 1, p 45). In one hold, he tries to bring together, value and obligation, and make the science of ethics fool-proof against subjectivism and relativism The task is big; and if it is faultless, it can aspire to be a complete philosophy by itself capable of being ranked as the ablest effort of the times to restore the distracted world once again to its Platonic moorings

## II

### BACK TO PLATO

The sum total of movements that have arisen in history have their rise in the normal urgency of the human spirit We require a philosophy however incomplete it may be Until the all-round failure of the day, we went by the beaten tracks, wore our blinkers and set off in directions that ultimately brought us into the 'brave new world' In political, commercial and undergraduate circles the question is put about the validity of set morals We are literally living in an age of sophists, epicureans and cynics A quick purge is needed to shift speculation and set out the basic content of ethical life. The confusions of moral standards and the failure of Eudaemonism and Kantian formalism led Hartmann into a move back to Plato. It is a commonplace that there is nothing that Plato

did not anticipate. After several centuries of metaphysical discussions, the great questions concerning conduct and life stand much as Plato left them. The growth of the scientific knowledge as Sir James Jeans has put it 'has done little more than negative the speculations of subsequent philosophers' (*The New Background of Science*). Many hold that 'out of Plato come all things that are still debated among men of thought' Plato contended that the real world is a world of values. This is the salient fact of Plato's doctrine of ideas. The values of goodness, beauty and truth are of supreme importance in the cosmos. They are not merely regulative principles which we derive from experience. Nor are they sheer abstractions which indicate the purpose or types of human aspiration, which we agree to admire. They are absolute and not relative. We cannot create them, but as we specialise in Ethics they are more clearly sensed by us. The ideas of Plato are realities, existing in their own right. Plato called them ideas and Hartmann calls them values that are absolute. Plato was the seer that saw with mystical directness these essences, like the sages of the Upanisads. To him they must have been like the Gods, radiant, clear and immortal, however fugitive our common vision of them may be. To be called back from the Platonic ecstasy of the contemplation of essences into the society of material things is perhaps an ethical descent. What Plato means by 'ideas' or 'forms' is this. In his metaphysics such things as goodness, justice, beauty and truth are not mere concepts of the mind. Nor are they mere attributes, but real existents with a status of their own in the intelligible realm. The ideas are immaterial, supersensible, entities, general universal forms abiding in their own world apart from the treacherous changes of the existential world. They just are and do not become. Sense and thought are radically disparate, yet everywhere connected. Nature is the realm revealed by our senses. It is only half real, but it suggests a further reality which lies beyond itself. It is a system of symbols and we ascend to truth by learning to pass from the symbols to the nonsensuous realities symbolised. True science is that which ascertains knowledge of forms. These forms, values, ideas or essences are already there to be discovered, before the discovery is made. Knowledge, according to Plato, is the discovery of that which there is to be discovered.

before the discovery is made. Goodness, beauty and truth belong to Plato's category of ideas apart from the physical forms that embody them. They are absolute realities independent of their apprehension by or manifestation in individuals. Man does not make values any more than he makes reality. The good formed the goal of all Plato's intellectual endeavour. It gave unity and system to the intelligible world harmonising the forms in one sovereign and universal purpose. As in the sense-world the sun is the source of light and of life to all created things, so in the thought-world the forms derive their rationality and being from the form of the good. Knowledge can be predicated only of forms. All else is mere opinion. The aim of philosophy is to take the soul beyond the bounds of sense to the world of 'pure forms'.

#### IDEAL SELF-EXISTENCE OF VALUES

Philosophy has shown little progress since Plato. The reason is that Philosophy is not the knowledge of the sense which is fleeting. Systems come and go and no one has a place in the end which will not vacate for the next. Genuine intuitions only remain as the keys which unlock the secret of reality. Despite the amazing advance of science in the last so many years, it is frankly difficult to see its bearing on the subject-matter of philosophy which always originates in the Socratic sublimity of wonder. The key of the known has not opened the chapter of the unknown. There are no final interpretations in science and there can be none in things of the sense. Genuine knowledge of forms alone can be real knowledge, all else being opinion. Hartmann's whole thesis is a phenomenological affirmation of the central thesis of Plato. Value is only intuitively and a priori apprehended. With the overthrow of formalism and Eudaemonism, he has established that the value-consciousness is necessarily a material objective consciousness. This means that even the values themselves originally do not have the character of laws and commandments. Values are just Platonic forms and are concrete, material and objective. They are not existing patterns. Valuational structures are ideal objects beyond all being and non-being. They are even apart from the really existing feeling of value which only can intuit it (Cf. Santayana's *Realm of Essence*). As

regards their content they are material. Since they are not empty abstractions, they are capable of being actualised in so far as they are not already actualised. Because they are concrete in their nature, they are supreme determinants of the positive ethical life. That is why Hartmann calls his ethics 'a material ethics of values'. Plato was the first who announced the existence of another realm of being other than that of existence. The scholastics called this 'essentia'. The notion was lost in the fog of obscurities that the Nineteenth Century thought created. Phenomenology restored it once again to the realm of Plato. Ideas have a peculiar kind of being. In order to know what Plato means we may take the idea of redness. Redness is obviously not the same thing as a red object such as a rose or a picture. It is not the sum total of such objects since the collection of all red objects will not make redness. It is a form which bestows upon sensible qualities whatever qualities they are found to exhibit. Among Plato's ideas are found ethical principles. These are ideal virtues or values. In their mode of being, values are Platonic ideas and belong to the realm which can only be spiritually discerned. They are not for the crude gaze. In the language of to-day values, of which Hartmann speaks, are 'Essences'. They do not emanate from things or real relationships. Nor are they added out of the percipient. Naturalism and subjectivism fall short of their mode of being. They are not formal or empty structures but possess vital contents. They are materials and structures which constitute a specific quality of things, relations or persons. They can neither be invented nor apprehended by thought. They are at once discerned only by an inner vision like the ideas of Plato. This sensing of values is just what Plato calls 'Beholding'. The sensing of values is primal and is embodied in acts of preference, approval and conviction and is a proof of its existence. The a priority of this knowledge is an emotional intuitive one. There can be no reflective and intellectual sensing of values. Values are not only independent of the things that are valuable (goods) but are actually their prerequisites. They are what lend the character of goods to things. Things are valuable only through them. Goods, in so far as they have value, have it, through participation in ideal



values. We find value in an object or person. Again, we set up a person for a pattern only under the influence of this inner discernment of the ideal value (vol 1, p. 197). In this, it is only the ideal values that guide us and affect our conduct. As Kant put it, values in so far as they are connected with actual situations, are 'conditions of the possibility of goods'. The experience of goods tells us that one thing is agreeable, that another is useful and another beautiful. What is implied in this experience is a knowledge of the agreeable, the useful and the beautiful. They are obviously presupposed. One must possess the standards beforehand. From the start, things fall under these standards. We must have an elemental feeling which connects all things and relations that come within its range of vision with the value of life. Otherwise an eternal back reference becomes inevitable and we cannot explain why a thing is good. Not all the welter of empirical elements that enter here can affect the a priority of values which dominates the domain of goods. 'That things and their relations can be goods or evils, that striving can be directed towards them, that there are volitional ends which themselves are ideal and yet are really determinant for actions, that there is such a thing as approval and disapproval of human conduct, that a conscience speaks directly in the depth of consciousness accusing, imputing guilt, imposing responsibility—all this is conceivable only on the presupposition that values, as a determining prius control the attitude which man takes up towards life' (vol 1, p. 206). A thing can be and is valuable only in relation to a value itself. Nothing is ever loved, striven for, and yearned after except for the sake of some value immediately discerned. Thus, it is plain that values possess the character of genuine essences (vol 1, chap. xvi, pp. 217-30).

#### VALUATIONAL A PRIORITY AND ABSOLUTENESS

If we accept values a priori, are they not prejudgments or assumptions of the subject? The whole claim of the a priori may be a bias. Even the a priority of theoretical knowledge is under the suspicion of subjectivism. What is the special proof of its objectivity? The Kantian proof consisted in the exposition of the relation of the categories to objects of another order. He relates it to a posterioristic object. In the domain

of theory, the procedure holds good, because categories are laws which dominate all real experience. Values are not like categories, because they are ideals that are to be actualised. As such, the proof of their objectivity is not to be found in the agreement with the real. Any discrepancy with the real is no evidence against them. Here, there is the difference between theoretical and practical insight and the nature of the a priori involved. The theoretical a priori has only the significance of being an element in knowledge. This significance fails if objective validity is lacking to the a priori. It then becomes merely a mode of presentation without agreement with an object. As such, it has no cognitive value. A practical a priori, on the other hand, has not the merit of being a factor of knowledge. It is a determining factor in life. In the assessment of values, in taking sides, in longing for and turning away from things or persons, we discern it unmistakeably. Thus, indeed, plays the rôle of the valuational a priori. The a priori of values is even more unconditional and absolute than that of theoretical categories. The whole responsibility of the valuational task falls on the sense of values which is the only possible source of knowledge in this regard. Values cannot be proved any more than the existence of things. We postulate the existence of things in the very act of perceiving. Thus, the belief in the ideal self-existence of values, according to Hartmann, 'stands entirely on the same level as belief in real self-existence'. To doubt the one is to doubt the other. The phenomena of the moral life presuppose 'a realm of values subsisting for itself—which exists beyond reality just as much as beyond consciousness—an ethical ideal sphere, not manufactured, invented or dreamed, but actually existing and capable of being grasped in the phenomenon of the feeling for values' (vol. 1, p. 104). As the prerequisites of goods, converting things into goods, values are essences. As essences, they have a genuine and fundamental being, the being of ideality, super-temporality and are super-historical and unchangeable (vol. 1, chap. xiv, p. 189).

#### CONSCIENCE AND ETHICAL A PRIORI

'What the evidence of the sensing of values is, is a relevant question. The answer is, that the phenomena of accountability,

responsibility, consciousness of guilt—conscience, in a word, provides the sought-for evidence. The deeper we force our way into the heart of the ethical phenomena, so much the more evident it becomes, the all-dominating character of values as essences. The moral consciousness does not confine itself to the weighing of actions and dispositions only. It imputes, it judges and also condemns. It metes out guilt and responsibility to the doer after the deed. The moral consciousness is incorruptible. It is relentless in its cold impartiality and punishes even one's own ego. What is called 'conversion' and 'change of heart' are the moral work of this power. In the most sensitive points of our personal life, we find the force of this against which it is hopeless to pit our selfish interests. The interests of the ego cannot go counter to its decree after a certain point. The merely empirical person feels in it the presence of a super power brooding over his actions and ready to round him up if he misbehaves. If the a priori of values is anywhere perceptible, it is remarkably here. The idea of the moral self itself is built upon purely valuational materials. Moral personality does not exist if there is no pure a priori of values. The broad phenomenon of conscience is at bottom just this primal consciousness of value found in the feelings of everybody. The well-known way in which conscience speaks fits most exactly the emotional a priori of the valuational consciousness which appears unsummoned. The so-called 'Voice of Conscience' is a basic form of the primal consciousness of values. It is the most elemental way in which the sense of value gains currency among moral beings and is obviously a self-dependent power in man, set apart from his will. As a purer force it has the influence of a higher power, a voice from the ideal world of values. Thus, conscience is the revelation of moral values in actual consciousness, their entrenchment within the reality of human life and is the most primordial form of the sense of value. This is possible only because values themselves are an existent prius, the conditions of the possibility of conscience itself (vol 1, p 220).

#### RELATIONALITY, RELATIVITY AND ABSOLUTENESS

Then, are the values sensed by the primal vision so absolute as they claim? The answer of Hartmann is that we should

know that the relationality of the values is not the same thing as their relativity. Every moral value is a value of disposition towards some person or a community of persons. As such, it has an object even where the act is purely inward without expression or overt deed. This relation inheres in the nature of the moral conduct in general, that is, of that conduct about the valuational quality of which moral judgments are concerned. This sort of relation to a subject is a part and parcel of the structure of the ethical content itself as marked off from that of the goods-value which goes along with it. The moral person stands behind his motivated acts. Values are attached to him as their bearer or carrier. This relation is not valuational relativity. It is native to the nature of the material itself and is inherent in the quality in which the matter of the value subsists. The substance of value always includes the reference to the person. It can come up for evidence only as an attribute or predicate of a person. This relationality is a part of the inner relational structure of moral values. The predicate throughout is drawn into the structure, though, in itself, it is absolute, it is the basic relational structure of the valuational content. Values are absolute as regards the subject who appraises them. All relationality to the subject affects only the structure of the content and not the value. The material is the concrete structure which has the value. Thus the moral worth of trust is not the trust itself which idea is the material. Its proper valuableness cannot be derived from anything else but is one that can be sensed only in valuational feeling. The valuableness is different from any given structure and every relation though it inheres in them. It is an 'ens sui generis', an essence of another sort. Thus, mere relationality is not capable of annulling self-existence and absoluteness. Whatever in its mode of being is not relative to a subject is absolute. Values simply confront the thinking subject as independent and immutable entities which he must take account of. They set up before him a self-subsistent regularity and possess an energy of their own. The point is clear that relatedness to a subject does not reduce values to relativity. The relatedness of goods to man is not at all a matter of thinking which can make a difference to the matter itself. Judgments of good and evil vary with the power of sharp and dull sensing of values. A person

cannot change the fact that a thing is good for him. Geometrical laws hold good only for spatial figures. Mechanical laws hold good only for real bodies. Physical laws apply only to organisms. But, in this form of relationality no relativity is implied in the categorical import of these laws. Similarly, psychological laws may be relative to psychic beings; but this does not mean that they exist only in the consciousness of these beings or that they can meddle with them at will. They are laws to which psychic beings are unconditionally subject. In the same way, the consciousness of good and evil is subject unconditionally to the laws of values and anti-values. In a word, the relatedness of these values to a human subject is not relativity to the subject. The difference between relationality and relativity must be grasped for a clear understanding of the status of ethical values. The relation of the value of goods to the subject is an absolute relation which is comprised in the content of their values. The thing and the subject here are objectively drawn into the structure of the valuational materials in the same way as cause and effect are included in the causal nexus. Values are not thoughts, visions or presentations. Knowledge of value is genuine knowledge of being standing on a par with every kind of theoretical knowledge. It abides unaffected by our beholding it and even in the act of beholding, the subject is a passive percipient and puts nothing out of himself. Values are patterns of the ideal ethical sphere which is a concern by itself with its own laws, orders and structures. The ethical ideal sphere of values is organically connected with the logical and the mathematical as well as with that of pure essences in general. In fact, it is a continuation of them however different their ideal structures may be from values (vol 1, pp. 51, 52, 189, 206-15)

#### LOGIC, MATHEMATICS AND ETHICS

If we ask the question what we do know, the casual reader of books will not find his path easy. If we go to Plato for the first time, we will be surprised to know that Plato found the keynote of the study of nature and philosophy in Mathematics. Plato is said to have inscribed on the door of his academy the words 'Let no one ignorant of Geometry enter'. The reason for this is not far to seek. The ideal sphere is

homogeneous in existence though varied in content. It overlies the whole sphere of being. The ontological and ethical ideal spheres are not isolated members from the rest of the spheres which mathematical and logical relations exhibit. Side by side is to be found a vast aesthetical sphere closely contiguous. Their mode of existence is a unity for knowledge since their patterns are known in all departments of a priori as in Logic and Mathematics. The being of values is parallel with them and the self-existence of all theoretical ideal forms. The actual and the real do not exhaust the whole sphere of being. The identification of actuality and being is a prejudice of the Nineteenth Century. Under the pressure of this prejudice, subjectivism crept in with the result that even Logic passed over into a psychology of thinking. Through the criticisms of 'Psychologisms' the meaning and standpoint of these sciences have changed. Logic or Mathematics or Ethics treats of a system of laws, dependencies and structures, which on their side control thinking. They are neither forms of thought nor can they in any way be infringed by thinking. Every study which phenomenology has opened up is essentially objective. There are ideal objects of knowledge which are just as independent of a knowing subject as real objects, inhabiting a sphere of ideal worlds. It is on a footing with belief in real self-existence which too cannot be proved but only perceived. The universality and necessity of the a priori of which Kant spoke are not something psychological only. No ideal object of a priori insight can be displaced at will or derived from the subject. Ideal objects offer a sort of resistance peculiar to their own nature. In this resistance we touch the objective ground of the ideal forms and the meaning of ideal self-existence in general. Take the proposition  $a^0 = 1$ . This does not mean that actually everybody knows it. In fact nobody can know it who has not an eye for the same. The mathematical training needed for its apprehension is a discipline that can give us the insight into its a priori truth. Yet, whoever has reached the level of that intelligence cannot think as he chooses to do. He must think that only what in itself is  $a^0$ , necessarily and objectively is equal to 1. You can carry the analogy to ethics. The moral judgments of value which declare that a breach of trust is revolting, and a 'malicious' joy in

another's misfortune 'reprehensible' do not refer to mere personal sensations. They refer to universal feelings of revoltingness and reprehensibleness, apart from the subject. That not all are capable of seeing the point, is no proof against it. Whoever is capable of this ethical specialization should judge thus and not otherwise. It is clear from this that the realm of values is not a manufactured product or an evolutionary weapon of the human race. It is neither invented nor dreamed by a subject in the protean shapes of his ideation. Values form a world by themselves and are self-subsisting and self-sufficient. They invade occasionally the conscience of man and mould him into a God out of his inferior stuff. Their territory is not a single and isolated plane; it comprehends within its unfathomable depths the secret of all valuational experience (vol. i, p. 222).

#### RELATION OF VALUE AND REALITY

If the valuational world has its own laws and structures, in what way is it connected with the real world? This question arises legitimately as every kind of ideal being is somehow related to the real. Logical ideal structures, including the mathematical, and all discernible essences are to a great extent structures of real being. Real being has still other structures and substrata which do not concern the world of ideal being as such. In short, the ranges of the ideal and the real structures interpenetrate. All connection between them is one that passes into the sphere of coincidence only. The non-coincident parts are left free. Ethical ideal self-existence is not indifferent to Ethical reality which contradicts it. It approaches it with its own standards and sets up its own authority. The moral consciousness feels this opposition in the form of the 'ought'. Though the self-existence of values is independent of their actualisation, values are not indifferent to actuality or non-actuality. The value of things is not indifferent to things. Within the sphere of forms to which as vehicles they are connected, values are not lukewarm towards what is contrary to them. Indeed, they have quite a peculiar way of facing the opposition. As ideal forms, values have no power to cause an impulsion or nullification. But, in the tension and actuality of the ethical relationship, a real power is seized by them and

is committed to an ideal tendency. The ideal tendency passes forthwith into the shaping of the real. Every ideal sphere is thus provided with a complete set of axioms, laws and highest principles. Existential categories of the real are themselves real categories. In the same way, knowledge as a special sphere of the relation of the real to the subject has its own principles. Values are principles in which we recognise the character of 'conditions of possibility' of those of the ethical phenomena. The material content of values in every connection detaches itself as something purely ideal. Its fulfilment in the real is not something necessitated by the content as a principle. Valuational discernment, always, and under all circumstances, regards the content as something beyond reality and actualisation. Values throughout are ideal self-existents; in so far as they are principles, they are from beginning to end only laws of the ethical ideal sphere. They do not play the rôle of ruling powers in the actual world as the categories do.

They are to be sharply marked off from categories. The choice which pertains to the moral law constitutes the basic strength and weakness of values together with its primary difference from categories. Values are weaker in influence than categories as they are not absolute unconditional despots carrying all before them. They are at the mercy of man who must lend his helping hand for their dwelling in reality. This power is not always at their disposal and when at their disposal it is an actual one. On another side, values are stronger than categories. Their actualisation must be done on a stable structure already at hand. They have to bear down all opposition, declare null and void all that is contrary to their nature. They must build on the categorical realities of acts, a new and higher formation. In a special sense values are creative principles bringing forth being out of non-being. The '*generatio ex nihilo*', impossible elsewhere, is just possible here. That is why, all normal values have a tendency to creative achievement. And in this inheres their essence. They are principles of the ethical sphere of action. This basic difference between valuational principles and categories constitutes the special essence of ethical phenomena. If values are as autocratic as categories, the moral worth of man is annulled. They would be simply existential categories of a higher order into which man is



pitch-forked as a part of his ethical make up. In a word, ethics will be washed out in a peculiar form of Ontology. The tension between the real conduct of a person and the idea of the right conduct in which alone lies the ultimate meaning of ethics would be lost in naturalism. The possibility of conduct contrary to value gives values their chance of pressing forward into the real. Through the actional sphere, values succeed in moulding the real within the radius of human history. Values, despite their inability to compel obedience, are in their own way more insinuating and persistent forces than categories. They have an energy and power of their own and swing with tension to oppose categories. The categorical world already formed waits for the sure touch from their hands. With its co-ordinated frame-work of higher structures, it polishes the real according to its patterns of ideal essences and lends a glimmer of meaning to reality (vol 1, pp 98, 232, 251)

#### OUGHT AND VALUE

Then, how does the 'Ought' come to be recognised in value? Hartmann seems to waver between two positions for an answer. Sometimes, he gives the impression that values are pure entities, and sometimes, he regards them as forces moulding the morals of man. He says that 'Value and the Ideal-ought-to-be are indissolubly bound up together' (vol 1, p 248). The ideal-ought-to-be is the value's own mode of being. Thus, moral values are inseparable from the obligation to realise them. The obligation is only a claim and not a coercion. Moral values only ought-to-be. But, from this ideal ought-to-be intrinsic to value, the 'positive ought-to-be' is different. The ought-to-be proceeding from values becomes positive 'where the ideal finds itself in opposition to reality' (vol 1, p 249). It then takes on a positive force. But, if an ideal power is to work in reality, it must find a point of support, a fulcrum in the real world. The empirical actual subject, as known in man, is the only carrier of values. The ideal power seizes hold of it, and through it, the ought-to-be is transformed into a real tendency. But, Hartmann does not like to minimise the glory of values. The ideal ought-to-be as such, is indifferent not only to the subject, but also to every other existent. The positive ought-to-be is not so, because it solicits the aid of the subject and

entrenches itself in reality. From this it appears, that the ought, and through it ultimately, value, by the help of the subject, determine reality. The personal subject is the being who senses values and launches them in ethical events. At the same time it must be noted, that the hands of the subject are not tied to follow values as ordinances. He is free in relation to the values he discerns. In a word, values entail only a moral claim which may be honoured or dishonoured (vol 1, pp 159-61)

### MAN AND VALUES

The character of values as principles has its ultimate fruition in man and man alone. The ethos of man is no mere ideal form. It is not a mere essence petering out into essentiality. Values, as principles of the moral world, break the bounds of self-existence and clutch at the fluctuating world of actual events. Ethics is not merely an abstract science of values. It is the educator of man's spontaneous living which awakens the sense of value. The aim of ethics is to guide man in his advance towards full self-direction. Between value and reality man is the liaison officer, the grand mediator. And, if he fails to do his job the creation of the world is incomplete. Man is depicted as 'the colleague of the demiurge in the creation of the world' (vol 1, p 31). If man fails to play his part, the world process must remain for ever incomplete. His cosmic littleness need not deter him from aiming at his metaphysical glory. Humanity's microscopic space-time dimension is not the last word of our thought. Ethics is super-temporal. 'The ought' transcends the very experience wherein it arises. The dominant Ought is pregnant with the vision of value. Ethics is regarded as the 'midwifery' of moral consciousness, whereby its implicit norms are made influential. Incessant strife can be reconciled only within an expanding system of ends and values. Without this, we do not know what good and evil are. 'Every age carries in itself dark seeds of ideas and no age entirely comprehends itself'. The self-existence of values 'overlies the whole sphere of being'. The ethical ideal sphere is only grasped by a being who is capable of the feeling for values. Ethical, ideal self-existence denies the real that contradicts it and stamps its own marks on reality. Herein arises man's tense awareness of the 'ought'. The force of the ought is implicitly contained

in the character of values as principles. The 'ought' adheres to the essence of ethical values, and forces slowly its way to the foreground even when it is dissuaded. The ought signifies direction to something. The value signifies the something itself to which the direction points. The good conditions the direction. Value is the content of the 'ought', its categorical structure. The ideal ought to be is the formal condition of the value. The value is the material condition of the 'ought to be'. The positive ought occurs where the ideal finds itself in opposition to reality. The real may be indifferent to the ideal. But, the ideal is always concerned about the real. The 'positive ought to be' is not an 'ought to do'. For, not everything that is not, but 'ought to be', comes into the domain of striving. The 'positive ought to be' presupposes in a given situation, the non-being of what 'ought to be'. As such, it is possible only in a real self-existent world deviating from the constitution of what ought to be. Values assume the form of principles and seize hold of the world of moral acts and change its outlines profoundly. They can transform non-being into being through man's unique position as the miracle of ethical phenomena. Man is a world-creator in little. Divinity as it were, leaves its cosmic throne and dwells in the will of man. Alone, among all the species of living beings, man only has the status of a teleological power. Hartmann takes care to reject cosmic teleology, which, in his opinion, would degrade man and destroy his dignity. In the upholding of the moral uniqueness of man he is second to none. Ethics is the training of man for his world-vocation, the demand upon him to be 'a colleague of God'. In any situation, what is at stake is always man and his power. He can lose it through folly or gamble it away. Hartmann rejects both the metaphysical personalism of Scheler and the 'as if' of Kant. For ethics as such, man singly alone is the moral being. The real ethical world is not that only of the moral subject with his acts. His loving creations and self-perpetuating works also came under its purview. Man widens and his moral nature expands as he participates in the valuational fullness of life. The clue to human existence is to be sought in man's proud vocation as the builder and fashioner of this world. As the mirror of being, he is the world's meaning. The sense of value must be awakened, the

grasp of it sharpened and refined for a fuller comprehension of life 'The apathy of feeling for values bears on its brow the stamp of inner misery' Life at hand always surrounds us with its munificence 'The tragedy of man is always that of one, who, sitting at a well laden table is hungry, but who will not reach out his hand because he does not see what is before him' The real world is one that is full and inexhaustible (vol 1, pp 27-44, 37, 39) And then why go empty away without running riot in the splendours of its inexhaustible material?

### VALUE THEORIES

Before going into a critical estimate of the work, it is worth keeping in mind some prominent value theories in the field today Many believe since Plato that values are objective to human beings and are a character of ultimate reality The position of the theistic tradition with regard to values may be summed up as follows The real world is a world of values Any faith in God is confirmed by all rightly interpreted experience that the values of goodness, beauty and truth are of supreme importance in the cosmos God in fact is the source of them. Value theories may be roughly classified as naturalistic and non-naturalistic The naturalistic theories resolve ethical characteristics without remainder into non-ethical The non-naturalistic theories hold that value is an addition to the non-ethical qualities and their combinations. For instance, Prof Alexander speaks of value as 'A tertiary quality' G. E. Moore regards value as a non-natural unanalysable quality. In general, subjectivistic theories of value define it in relation to mental states which do not give us their objective reality Objectivistic theories convert logical realism into ethical realism and confer on values an objective, epistemological status The weakness of all subjective theories consists in their failure to distinguish between the peculiar quality of moral obligation in contrast to mere desires The resulting relativism is fatal to ethics Such theories are clearly outside the pale of validity which is vital to axiology Social theories of value cross ethical relativity by going beyond the individual and placing the ethical norms in the good of the group But how can even this give us an ought? To say that a thing is socially good is not the

same thing as saying that we ought to do it Hartmann's ethics comes under the objective theories of value Mr Moore is the best British exponent of the same. To both values are super-temporal, timeless and transcendental With this brief conspectus of ethical theories we can pass on to a criticism of Hartmann's ethics.

## PART II

### A CRITIQUE OF ETHICAL REALISM

#### I

Hartmann launches the first systematic and comprehensive statement of the ethics of realism It is an impressive piece of scholarship with a grace of doing that deserves to be ranked as a classic Everything about it is admirable except its lack of ultimate cohesion It is a mathematically grounded ethics predetermined from being 'corrupted by philosophy' But, by a sort of dramatic irony, the author slips step by step into speculations that ultimately poach on the preserves of metaphysics In the end, the book gives us the impression of a work unfinished, and an adventure put off before its logical terminus Absolute self-existence of values is the salient theme Values are conserved, not because an omnipotent God sees to it that they are safe, nor because the Universe is such that they can hardly be missed, but because they are eternal and absolute in themselves They have their headquarters in the realm of subsistence, where there is no variableness or shadow of turning Moore gave the clearest exposition of this view before Hartmann. He believes that the good exists in spite of the non-existence of everything else and holds that for a thing to possess intrinsic value, means to possess a character which it would have in a world in which even causal laws are different from our own Hartmann goes to the length of equating the moral proposition that 'a breach of trust is revolting' with the mathematical truth  $a^0=1$  By the special standpoint he adopts, he places values beyond all the stars This self-existent isolation in his view confers on values the dignity of immutable verities Then, he holds, ethics would have a solid foothold in a changing world Though the attempt is remarkable, the result in the end is not convincing.

1. To begin with, Realism in Ethics repeats the errors of Realism in Logic. It throws no light on the problems broached by Ethics. It defines the nature, locus and structure of the good, much in the same way as it does an external object. If Dualistic Realism is a false view in Logic, there is no need to accept it as true in Ethics. The pure percipient and the object perceived are abstractions that are set up beyond experience. It is wrong to isolate a part of experience and deem it as an absolute existent. The mind is not like a tiny switch, which when turned throws a flood of light on the external object in the act of knowing. The real is once for all a whole. Our world of experience is a concrete articulation in it. The mind cannot have its 'nose up against things'. The Percipient cannot go out of himself to saunter into a world totally strange to his essence. Two absolutely disparate realms of being can never hang together in a perpetual act of communication. The mind supplies what the world lacks and breathes into it ideal contents that are not merely personal sentiments. The Realist leaves the world as a brute fact. The Idealist looks at its value aspect and concludes that it is not a chapter of accidents, nor a haphazard heap of things and thoughts outside the divine sweep and its partly intelligible and partly unintelligible ends. He comprehends facts under the standpoints of values and thus transcends the Dualisms that the Realist perpetuates.

2. Hartmann assigns only a subsistential reality to moral propositions. Subsistence is used to describe the being that belongs to propositions. Facts and mental processes are said to exist rather than subsist. The Realist theory tries to convince us that fantastic and impossible objects of thought such as unicorns, round squares, Alice's tea party with the March Hare and the Mad Hatter, have an independent being. Russell, once an exponent of this realism gave it up declaring 'Logic, I should maintain must no more admit a unicorn than Zoology can' (*An Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, p. 169). This logical error persists in the ethical outlook of realism. Is it possible to turn propositions into self-subsistent entities? The Conceptualists like Kant believe that propositions have their reality in a mental act of conceiving or meaning. Without this they have no being even so thin as subsistence. One

can distinguish propositions as objects of thought from thinking itself and yet hold that there could be no such objects without thought or no thought without such objects, just as one might distinguish the size from the shape of a physical object and yet know that there could be no size without shape or shape without size. The Realist believes that the immutability of truth demands the self-subsistence of logical and mathematical entities. In a word, before mind was, truth is. Thus all propositions are locked up in reality to be discovered by the various sciences. The Conceptualist holds that this is a desperate attempt at turning abstractions into realities. Mind is the vehicle, the all-inclusive medium in which the propositions dwell together in their eternity and immutability. Without this assumption, explanation fails. If the values are immaterial, supersensible entities, how can they interact with gross physical bodies? If true being is ascribed to what we speak of as the good, the just, the true and the beautiful, the question arises, can the empirical man be one thing, and that in him which stands for goodness, justice, truth be another thing, existing absolutely and yet inseparable from him? Are both forms—the material and the ideal—actually and truly existent realities, the one apprehended by sense perception and the other not so, but nevertheless really subsistent? If the values are to be understood they must be somehow fixed in the nature of things, whose nature also is unchangeable. This means that they are rooted in reality as an eternal order of rightness and wrongness. The Realist mistakes a word for the thing itself. The Platonic flaw consisted in the simple act of attributing substantial reality to our general notions and ideas. To attribute substantial being to common relations in which existence is exhibited is a fallacy. It would be truer to regard being itself as the expression of the union of matter and form which are coeval and co-ordinate. They are distinguishable but never divisible like the word and its meaning. That is the reason why values can never be regarded as neutral, simple, quality-less essences. They are vibrant with life and concrete with force. The death of Socrates, the crucifixion of Christ and the episode of Bruno clearly indicate their power in history.

3. The whole ethics of Hartmann stands or falls with the

notion of the material a priori. The a priori self-existence of values and the intuitive character of our moral perceptions are assumed as self-evident. Though phenomenological method is everything in Value-ethics, it is regrettable that Hartmann has not added any note on it. If the phenomenological essences are given immediately and intuitively, the ethics of Hartmann differs very little from intuitive ethics. Nor has he made clear the notion of the essential, the phenomenal and the a priori. He only says that the a priori is something self-given and not a function of the subject. Subjectivistic and functionalistic a priorism is a confusion and a misunderstanding of the originally objective character of everything knowable a priori (vol 1, p 164). The values themselves as objects of a prioristic insight pertain to the subject matter and not to the subjective form of the ethical consciousness (vol 1, p 169). This is intuited through a special mode of apprehension capable of experiencing unities or totalities of meaning as facts of an essential or phenomenal order. That is to say, the essences cannot be seized by any reflective thought but must only be sensed in the valuational feeling. Value-ethics is thus primarily based on valuational feeling. This is a roundabout way of saying that the ethical phenomenon is a subject of pure intuition. The difficulty is, on principle, it can neither be proved nor disproved. There is no way in which either the existence of the intrinsic value or the intuition of it, in any given case, may be tested or verified. Even supposing that we have intuited a particular value, it proves no necessary connection between the intuited quality of value and the moral obligation which is a peculiar power in the human conscience. If values are simple subsistences, they serve only as objects of aesthetic contemplation. But, for morality, they must signify an 'ought'. The 'ought' element is the concrete force which instals value in existence. This means that the 'ought' is to be regarded as a further intuition intuited on the intuition of a value. This will reduce ethics as the outcome of a process of three distinct intuitions —

- (a) There should be an ineffable transcendental quality of value.
- (b) Any given case should be intuited as an instance of that.



- (c) A connection must be established between such a quality and moral obligation through a final intuition

This will only lead to a needless multiplication of intuitions for a simple act of conscience which commands in an imperative mood to do or not to do a particular thing, in all known cases of moral conflict. This is the 'moral law within' which Kant set off against 'the starry heavens above' in the same act of wonder

4 The valuational a priori of which Hartmann speaks is only a feeling. In this respect it is surprisingly close to the Intuitionist school of ethics. But the question is: is the consciousness of right and wrong really knowledge at all or merely a kind of feeling? If one identifies it with any kind of feeling, it may ultimately involve the total destruction of its objective character. Feelings, as Sidgwick put it, vary from A to B without either being in error. On this account, it is better to use the term 'reason', as he suggests, to denote the faculty of moral cognition. If mere feelings are the informants of moral judgments, they represent nothing more than our likes and dislikes. Then, how can there be objective truth about matters of right and wrong? That is why Sidgwick maintained that the moral faculty is rational. The moral side of our nature belongs to the intellectual part of life rather than the merely emotional one. The mere distinctiveness of a feeling cannot give it superiority over other feelings. If ethics is based on feelings, morality will only mean what I feel about my conduct, or more correctly what others feel about my conduct. Conscious reflection always adds its value to any given point of moral tension. The question then concerns not so much the existence of any self-evident propositions as their ultimate validity. Hartmann may intuit the moral principle 'Telling lies is bad'. The question is, 'how are we to settle the matter when we begin to doubt this in a given case?' The doubt also, it must be admitted, is as intuitive as the principle doubted. Thus, ought I to speak the truth to a deliberate assassin? What light does Hartmann's Ethics throw on this? If moral intuitions are so self-evident, how can he account for variety and contradictions in them? To the ancient Spartan, stealing was a virtuous act, to the medieval Christian, religious

persecution was a duty. In these two instances, they relied only on what they deemed to be self-evident intuitions. The fact is, moral propositions actually collide with one another and Hartmann himself admits final antinomies in the realm of values. The precepts of humanity may go counter to those of veracity. It seems self-evident that I ought to speak the truth at the cost of life or save a life at the cost of a lie. What am I to do when I can only speak the truth at the cost of life or save a life at the cost of a lie? No expedient so far imaginable can resolve these antinomies in moral life. In most moral matters there is an elaborate process of reasoning ending in a personal commitment. Immediate self-evident guidance is missing even in apparently simple cases of love and hatred. The moral feeling unless grounded in reason will be arbitrary. A rational moral sense with conscience in the chair, cannot neglect consequences on which the Utilitarians laid so much stress. Where conscience is satisfied, the case always turns out to be the best under the circumstances. Few people will agree with Kant as to the duty of disclosing to a deliberate assassin the whereabouts of his intended victim, if the truth can be suppressed by a lie. What is a moral act without its consequences? If a lie turns out to be the saviour of humanity, there is no point in asking it to seek the truth which may be a disvalue after all. Behind moral values, there is always a consciousness of consequences, by virtue of which alone, acts are, in general, regarded as good or bad. If from the moral act all the consequences it involves are abstracted, it is only a simple event irrelevant for moral purposes. The Valuational a priori loses its worth if it is only a way of feeling towards things. The real moral reason is a way of conscience with an awareness of consequences. There is no point in asking a man to go dry if drunkenness does not make him thick in speech, unsteady in gait and irrelevant in talk. Even in bad cases of moral turpitude, we do not find—on principle of course, the self-evidence required. For example, mankind has established a convention that lawful killing is no murder, and that compulsory taxation is no robbery. Here language plays us false. But how can any sort of killing or compulsory relieving of lawful property be removed from the category of murder or robbery? On purely theoretical grounds, there is hardly a case

in which our intuitions can give us an unmistakable lead without the aid of reason, which always insinuates the idea of well-being into a moral situation. Reason is the divine element in man, and an intuition that is not grounded in it rings false. An ethic that regards it as secondary tends to be self-centred. There is a danger in the new ethics. It has a disdain for the more positivist philosophies of August Comte and John Stuart Mill based on principles of benevolence and sympathy. A priori ethics is right in holding that our moral values are ultimate and un-analysable intuitions. But it is totally wrong in bringing to bear the a priori scale alone without any reference to consequences of an act, which is as important a feature of moral life as intuitional discernment. Eudaemonism is right in insisting on this part of 'the ethical life'. It only erred in identifying the good with happiness though happiness is a distinct component in the good. Thus, an ethics of conscience with a concern for consequences, on the broad basis of universal welfare will give the rational checking needed for any one-sidedness of outlook.

5. When we begin to doubt the so-called self-evident propositions in ethics, the force of Hartmann's contention weakens. What is the meaning of saying that the ethical values have the same ontological status as mathematical or logical truths? Take his examples. 'A breach of confidence is revolting'. 'To gloat over another's misfortune is contemptible.' Now, a logical truth is a truth the denial of which is unintelligible. We cannot deny the same in one breath and talk sense in another. But do ethical propositions bear this mark? That a breach of confidence is revolting or to gloat over another's misfortune is contemptible are not self-contradictory propositions. Ethical life lies only in the violation of such rules, perhaps in the presence of principles which are more imperative. Often ethical life arises in a tense conflict between values which have the same unconditional claim. Hence, the view that ethics has the same ideal status as logic is false. The case is much more unfavourable when compared with mathematics. Take a class of six students. If a sum be given for answer to them, all will admit that only one answer can be correct. The six boys cannot give six answers and maintain that all the different answers are right. But in ethics,

the same question may be put, for which, different answers may be returned. Suppose Hartmann is interviewed by a Press representative and asked the question 'Is Hitler right in getting rid of the lives of certain ring-leaders to save Germany in good time?' To be sure, his phenomenological intuitions do not throw any light on the point that can be regarded as self-evident. After a deep deliberation, he may give an answer which plainly leaves room for other alternatives. The fact is, moral life has an objectivity peculiar to it which runs concurrently with an incurable relativism. Ethics is not of the same stuff as mathematics or logic. The objectivity involved in it is of a different sort. The relationship between moral life and communal well-being is very close. Our blood boils when injustice is done. We crave for retribution when we are wronged. The best of us only want a tooth for a tooth and nail for a nail when we are needlessly hurt. Our moral energies are roused at the sight of injustice, cruelty and disgrace. An act of kindness is universally applauded. Moral life consists in guiding these primitive feelings in the light of reason. Moral life itself contains a hint of the primordial constitution of the world in which the moral agent lives and against which transgression may amount to moral ruin. All the moral values have their locus neither in the heavens above nor in the earth below, but in the human heart which speaks with the double voice of conscience and reason. Values have their roots in a reality in which man also participates. Morality is a form of cosmic well-being, a tendency for balance, synthesis and wholeness at the core of all being. What Schopenhauer calls 'Sympathy' is the chief source of it.

6 Ethical realism holds and implies that ethical consciousness is an epi-phenomenon. The reality of ethical values is neither qualified, modified nor determined by human or divine consciousness. This is a short-sighted mishandling of the problem involved. If we can conceive of a world totally rid of consciousness—the most impossible thing of course—where is the distinction between 'higher' and 'lower'? It is only in and through consciousness that existence is uttered as a value. In a world in which all the lights are gone, *A* cannot be distinguished from *B*, nor *B* from the rest. The mind—some mind—holds the rules-book of the play. The actuality

of value itself is prehended only by a mind. The world of fact is an actualisation of one of the countless possible patterns of values that exist in a being prior to everything else. To divorce ethical consciousness from ethical reality is again an error which makes no meaning.

7 Hartmann places values beyond the glory of the earth. They simply hang in the air because they are rooted neither in consciousness nor in existence. They are transcendental beacons that dread the mortal touch of man and time. If so, how are they manifested in time and in the actual lives of *A* and *B*? Are they mere possibilities? If they are possibilities, how do they become actual? If they are mere essences, how can they become existents? These difficulties being obvious, one has to admit that the actual world itself is the meeting point of value and fact which are organically related. The existence or non-existence of the world and its inhabitants makes a profound difference to the content of values. If values are cut adrift from the actual world, they die a lonely death until resurrected by a human or divine mind. Existence is significantly comprehended under value. As such, a value in itself, for itself, and to itself, has no value for ethical purposes. When we ask, what are the things that are good and is there anything that has intrinsic value, Hartmann gives us the whole realm of values as having absolute worth. But this cannot be. All the values scheduled in part 2 need not necessarily possess intrinsic worth. If a man shows fine courage and firm love, what is it that is meant by calling these values absolute? This is a mistake. He assumes that all values have intrinsic worth. What is good is what is good for something or some one. It is only by subsequent reference that we come to recognise that such mediate goods must have reference to some ends to which they are means. And so, we are, by a process of deliberate reflection, led to the conception of some good, which is not instrumental but is valued purely for its own sake. There can be only one such value. Most of the values outlined in the book have only instrumental worth. The fact is, what is good first signifies a means to some desired or desirable end. Ultimately, it leads to the ideal itself implied in all desiring and as such the wholly desirable. This, we call, the supreme good, which Hartmann has no right to set aside. The highest wisdom of life lies in the

pursuit of the ideal or the highest value, at the gates of which all the auxiliary values should be thrown up. This aspect Hartmann has not brought out.

8. There is a fundamental mistake in the very conception of value Hartmann presents. Values are neither conative drives nor lures of feeling to him, but simple ontological subsistents that somehow pull the strings from afar. This is wrong. Desire is the most vital ingredient in every value-situation and without it nothing has a value. In a typical value-situation three factors are witnessed —

(1) A thing that is valued, (2) the subject that values; (3) the relation between the two, which itself is what is meant by value. To cut out two items in the complex and set up one of them as absolute is a piece of illogical thinking. If these elements go to make up a value-situation, then values would be no longer transcendental entities, but just real relations that are found in real situations. We cannot separate value from desire because it is the nature of the human mind itself to exercise acts of preference, to declare for or against. As such, value can only be a relation between the ontological world and a desiring subject. About values which function in a vacuum we know next to nothing. Any object, any situation or any event has no value until it is desired. That is why when we speak of a thing as good we also put the question, good for what or good for whom? Theoretically, every object, perhaps has an intrinsic value which pertains to the object as such and a value it has for an appraising subject. But what the worth of an object is, in and for itself, no one can ever know. It would be in the same metaphysical position as thing-in-itself. At least for human purposes, values have their worth through the desire which precedes them. But, if the character of values is such that all people desire them, then, there will be no point in saying that we ought to desire them. We value things related to some one or another, though, this relatedness does not lead to subjectivity. In all our doings, we do not stand off from the main stream of life and enjoy a contemplative spree. In every valuation, we are coming into vital touch with events that are falling into personal points of view, at the back of which the energies of desire are ready to hand. The whole problem of the relation between

desire and value has not received due consideration from Hartmann.

9. Hartmann's ethics is tinged with a high degree of egocentrism, as is evidenced by his radical restriction of teleology to man and the denial of the divine hand. In the whole world, to him, neither God nor nature counts but only man. Alone among all entities, he has the proud privilege of value-sensing. If this is the case, all other creatures except man should miss the value of being. This would mean, there is no worth in being outside man. This is a mistake which amounts to megalomania. The whole of existence is set round an axiological framework embracing different grades of being ranging in different degrees of evolutions. We can only be misled by paths of technical scholarship if it lacks a synoptic vision, a mastery of the whole in idea. All reality is a synthetic unity. At any focal point, it is only an organisation of its minutiae with the power of interpenetration. Nature, God, space-time are simple isolates from a primordial matrix laden with the riches of possibility, actuality and necessity. Man is not the only being, disengaged from his organic interconnections. There are refinements, subtleties, beauty spots, depths of comedy and tragedy within this being, accessible to different grades of insight. Real being is a fabulous plenitude of ideas, sensations, feelings and dramatic episodes shot through with meaning. Our ideas of this being are as varied as our contacts with it. There are wholes within wholes, parts within parts, and spheres within spheres, each with its own globe of values and desires accessible to some grade of living agents or other. In a broad sense, we are all different aspects of one grand enterprise of the divine mind. Even at the low animal level, there are flashes of aesthetic insight, noble feeling and maternal affection. The song of the nightingale is an expression of some elemental value that is felt at the core of its being. Man also, is of a piece with the whole of nature, which word has never been understood by many philosophers. In human beings, the various modes of functioning display a variety of adaptation to special subtleties of circumstance. They are only more complex, interwoven and meaningful. To make man the hub of the universe is to lose the sense of proportion needed to keep a firm hold on life as a whole. Too much concern about ourselves only makes

us more ridiculous in our own eyes. And for the objectivity of ethics, it is not necessary to deny the worth of all except man. All life is impregnated with the principle of value as the prius of the world order.

10 Finally we have to face the ancient feud between Idealism and Realism. It is a mistake to regard Idealism as the deduction of the world from certain a priori principles. All idealism is only a criticism of life and an interpretation of experience through a scale of values. All theories of explanation must be ultimately framed only on its broad basis. The mind longs for ideal completeness and ultimate coherence. A story that does not give it is felt as false. If Hartmann puts the question why, we can only answer 'because it is a priori'. Just as there is an Ethical a priori, there is an 'Idealistic a priori' working at the bottom of all enquiries which Phenomenology has to take note of. Idealism is not committed to the theory that values are made by us. It only presents the case for a more thorough-going relationship between the realms of value and fact. Realism does not believe that spiritual values have a determining vote in the constitution of the universe as organising principles. Man accidentally happens to realise values that are discovered by him, because he cannot help it. His existence or non-existence, as such, makes no difference to these immutable essences. They go on with the game even when the players fall asleep. On this view, whatever connection there is between value and fact, is only a chance coincidence. Some gigantic fluke occasions their contact and as soon as they come together, they happen to work as if by a pre-established harmony. The question is, even if some chance were to bring them together, how can it generate the 'ought' or moral obligation with which the whole science of ethics stands or falls. The Idealist eschews chance and establishes a more rational relation between values, the valuing agents, and the theatre in which these operate. Health, virtue and courage are not values in the abstract. Only the healthy person, the virtuous conduct and courageous deed are valuable. Idealism is the sworn foe of all abstractions. The Realist does not believe in the concretion of values in a consciousness. The Idealist cannot conceive of them as otherwise. The fact is simple to understand. When we put the question



'what is it that has value?' one has to admit that it is after all certain states of consciousness and nothing else. The artist, the poet and the philosopher are only capturing certain phases of consciousness that are of absolute value. If consciousness is abstracted from the process what is it that remains? There can be no enjoyment *per se* existing in *abstracto*, out of touch with personal consciousness.

Throughout the masterly survey of the subject, the motif of Hartmann's research is an unmistakable search for a centre as a stable background for civilisation. He finds Theism inadequate and realises the meaning of life in the worship of eternal values. In admitting that in spite of everything changing, there is something which does not change, he has gone half way to meet the idealistic thesis. This shows how imperative is the need of grasping the permanent element in life as the one that remains in the midst of mutations. A mere *a priori* ethics, however, cannot set right the balance in an age when everything has failed to stir us to new enthusiasms. The hiatus it creates between fact and value is fatal to its ultimate cohesion. The attempt to pose an ethics without the strength of metaphysics and Theology, though not unsuccessful in theory, cannot be regarded as of much positive use in the end. The greatest ethical dynamic of life is that which issues from the conviction that virtue wins at last and the good triumphs. He who does not feel this is an utter stranger to the real strength of a great personality. It is not mere sympathy with values or their *a priori* intuition, but full faith in their efficacy as spiritual principles that can save us. Goodness may be perfectly good but if it lacks power, goodness will only mean little more than an ultimate irony fit for scathing satire. It is the union of goodness with power that can ever hope to inspire the spirit of man. To buy relief from a theoretical difficulty by the complete elimination of the absolute in ethics is no compliment to it. It can only undermine its foundations in the long run and corrupt an entirety of outlook with a fatal scepticism. A theistic pattern always helps the moral life and puts heart and hope in human endeavour. When we set up relations with it, we feel new strength and courage in facing the tasks of life. God somehow touches our universe of discourse as a persistent fact in self-consciousness. The idea is all important, though, we do

not know wherefrom we got it. To reckon without it is to impose a serious limitation on the natural course of ethical life itself, though it is by no means, a postulate of ethics

## II

### PROBLEMS UNSOLVED

1. The inalienable quality of values in ethical realism is their eternity. The new faith in values takes the place of the old faith in a heaven. The glory of man is overshadowed by the superior character of the values he discerns. Man's highest values are to be fulfilled here and here alone. Goodness, truth, beauty and love have their expectations here, in this planet. In reaching these ideals, man's highest dreams are realised. This is a mood of ethical optimism, a modern counterblast to the philosophy of Schopenhauer. On principle, it is always possible to challenge cosmic optimism by disclosing the reverse side. Not all the conquests of science can ensure for man more than a brief spell of enchantment. Within the period of actual birth and actual death, if we eliminate, all the hours that we spend in sleeping and securing the elemental needs of existence, the period that remains over for the preliminary task of getting rid of our deep-rooted prejudices against the good life itself, is comparatively negligible. Even the most fortunate man on this planet, and under the present conditions of civilised human life, cannot aspire, for anything more than a limited realisation of his ideals, which only produces unlimited discontent, for the part yet to be accomplished. Even a round of lives is too little to give us deep insight into the highest values here. One of the telling ironies of life is, that, just when we are about to settle down into some sort of convictions, we are removed from the scene against our will. What the wisdom of an ant seriously puts together, the wind of an accident wafts away in the twinkle of an eye. Then, does not the highest wisdom consist in living like the cow grazing on the green pastures or the gymnosophists of a forgotten civilisation, with a generous contempt for all effort and a large pity for great passions? At last, we see the signs of decay, and succumb to the fun that the molecules of our body poked at us for a time. Beauty ends with youth. The good life is a tragedy of high

ntentions self-defeated or the vanities of a race of mortals who ay their last adoration to Seraphius, the God of Death. A. E. ives us some fine lines on this aspect of sadness evident in he good life.

'The flame of beauty far in space—  
Where rose the fire · in Thee? in me?  
Which bound the elemental race  
To adoration silently?'  
'Ah' but they vanish; the  
Immortal train laden with adoration,  
Forth from this heart the flow that all in vain  
Would stay the proud eternal powers that flee  
After the chase in burning exaltation '

It is the values and not the valuers that are eternal after  
ll If this is the last word of our life there is a downright  
anity in all our aspirations All our 'isms' and 'ologies' are  
ut tales imagined to amuse our eternal childishness, perhaps,—  
who knows—we divert ourselves with values as we do with the  
tories of the ass, the tub, or the Decameron Life is short and  
rt is long Values are shy angels that charm us in our golden  
oments and leave us to our fate after getting their recognition  
n Hartmann's view, in technical parlance, the alleged eternity  
f values is not descriptively or phenomenologically identical  
nith the immortality of the cognising self The new ethics  
uppresses the eternity of the self to supply permanence to  
alues But, do values subsist outside the real nature of the  
elf? Hartmann has not at all given a convincing metaphysical  
ccount of the self, on the validity of which alone, a scientific  
thics can be planned The eternity of the self must be  
ostulated along with the eternity of values to complete the  
onditions demanded by the moral science. Values are the  
ock-bottom of the self, which is the source of all essences

2. Hartmann has not reviewed his main point in all its  
earings. If abstract universals are not simple 'as ifs', how  
an they be real except as the manifestations of the supreme  
pirit? Ethical realism requires a theistic basis for its materials  
o be overlaid. Moral life is intelligible only on the postulate  
f moral perfection by virtue of the significant order per-  
neating the universe A healthy faith in the general integrity  
f the cosmos and of man's fundamental ontological demands

the great step needed to ward off scepticism in the ethical undertaking. The theists expressed this basic faith in terms of God, the naturalists in terms of instinct and the mystics in terms of the absolute. Without an intuition into this sacred act of primordial mysticism, the sets of premises that follow lack the distinctive tang of truth. Wonder continues to be the worship of wisdom also, because even the greatest man of Athens said that he knew nothing. Though the work of Hartmann is the most important ethical pronouncement of the century, its philosophical idiom fails to deliver the valid viewpoint.

### III

#### THE CONTEMPORARY MOOD AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW ETHICS

Today, a generation is growing to maturity, which, to all intents and purposes, is drifting in a vacuum. The educated world finds it impossible to accept the old world view of religion. A time has come when talk of religion is done with a blush. Value is the new God which is commissioned to fill the void caused by the passing away of the old Gods. During the past three decades, a great deal of literature has appeared on the subject of value. Time is not yet ripe for the final computation of its worth, but there is no doubt that it has become the key-word of progressive thought. The exchange of the term value for the good is the signal of the general movement in thought towards a 'thickening up' of the categories. As Prof. Urban put it 'the new orientation in value releases us from all those inhibitions which arise from narrow and ex-parte definitions of reality and truth and that sets free the deeper intuitions of the soul' (*Intelligible World*, p. 177). Hartmann is not a follower of the 'Great Tradition', though to him, values are eternal. He keeps his exposition within bounds of reckonings that are borne out by ethical consciousness. He discountenances the religious underpinnings of neo-Platonism and Christianity alike in the interests of the ethical argument. He accomplishes his enterprise with evident fulness of knowledge and mastery over materials. It is a really complete and systematic setting forth in fine literary form—thanks to the noble exertions of Dr. Stanton Coit—of the ethics of realism.

Nietzsche was the first to make the momentous call for the transvaluation of values and explode the myth of the tree of knowledge. The myth of the tree is the point around which centred the traditional ethics of western Christianity. Nietzsche disclosed its startling inaccuracy and made the clear discovery (1) that values are many, and (2) that we know neither the entire manifoldness nor its unity. The prophecy of the serpent is the great deception. Even today, man does not know good and evil. But Nietzsche went beyond limits in his craving for the morality of power and beauty which ultimately upset his discovery with an incurable relativism. All the same, the discovery is epoch-making and gave its present turn to ethics. He has once for all shown that the metaphysics of morals has lacked the foundation which is the phenomenology of values or axiology of morals, which is the first and chief concern of ethics. The realm of values contains the secret of good and evil. Not until we know it as a whole can we know it in parts. The real fruit of the tree of knowledge can only be tasted after we know its manifoldness and fulness. But, in this piece of discovery, Nietzsche overshot the mark. His notion of transvaluation implies the relativism of values which undoes his work. He failed in the joy of his new discovery to see that value is a fresh field of being exposed to view calling forth a critical sifting of ethical contents. The task of the new ethics is to achieve a synthesis of the two fundamental concepts which historically grew up in sharp contrast, the Kantian a priority of the moral law and the original manifoldness of moral values. A reunion of these factors and a rediscovery of their inherent connection is the outstanding merit of the new ethics. It gives back to ethical priorism its original richness of content and sets up the authenticity of the primal consciousness of value as the very foundation of the ethical science. The work is inspired by a critical spirit and offers a religion without God. The disposition of the time is curiously confused; it is a compound of feverish restlessness and blunted discouragement, a fearful presage and hang-dog renunciation. There is neither depth nor insight in our pursuit and we are overtaken by an uncanny feeling that our whole modern life has missed its meaning. The tranquillity and love of contemplation that characterise the moral beauty of a nobler life are lost. We are living neither a life of select

sensations nor of noble thoughts. Our meditative power has become shallow through a craze for 'nonstop' sensations. We are restless, precipitate, dull and blasé and have lost the genius to be astonished. We have grown up in a somewhat false alienation from light and beauty. Ere we are half way through our adventure, we have an ironical smile for the life before. When we cultivate the pose of resignation in the wake of this defeatism, as a virtue we put the fool's cap on this great irony. What can Hartmann's ethics tell us in this age of grim humour? The question is natural, because the book is pretentious under cover of modesty. Though many ethical questions are left out unsolved, the major thesis of Hartmann, after all, seems to be the only intelligible alternative to civilisation, if it is to reject religion at all. He has embarked on a renaissance of the great ethical tradition of ancient Greece and the modern Christian world to stir an age of prose and common sense to the heights of moral beauty. Why set the heart in our limited toy-world and its transitory prizes? The real world around is a kingdom of values outside all the municipal limits, rich, affluent and replete with glory. An awakening of the sense of value is the only way of reviving the classic taste in the life around. The esoteric wisdom that forms the gate-way to moral beauty enables us to enter vividly into life and relish to the full all the delicacies of its intercourse. We are today caught up in an atmosphere of crisis faced with an existence so gaudy and overdone, and yet, so intolerably empty. The best spirits of the age are only brooding over a world's disillusion. Can the sense of value give us the light? The philosophical ethics of today stands at the parting of the ways between the old and new kind of philosophising and is taking the first initiative in the rediscovery of the forgotten realm of value once sighted by Plato. Its goal is noble and is animated by a new kind of love and devotion for the task on hand, though, its enthusiasm, in the end, is diluted to the point of an ultimate disappointment. The idealism of the new ethics has lost a good deal in its failure to raise the moral argument to its logical height. In ruling out religion from its range, Hartmann spoiled its lasting appeal. Everything is admirable in the work except its Philosophical settings. A well-rounded ethos settled in religious and aesthetic culture is the very pink of good taste.

in its most finished form. Hartmann has not carried the moral argument to this height of beauty. But, with all its great faults, it is one sober, high and grand way of thinking that is bound to exercise a signal influence over the future of ethical research.

## PART III

### HARTMANN AND TELEOLOGY

The introduction of the personal subject as the only mediator between value and reality leads us on to the problem of human teleology. How can the ought-to-be be actualised? It can be done only in and through the formation of a finalistic nexus. The dynamic of the whole procedure is the attraction issuing from the final end. 'The finalistic determination inserts itself without opposition into the causal, precisely because, the course of its own actualisation itself is causal' (vol 1, p 277). As such, finalism, far from presupposing indeterminism, presupposes a causally determined world. The ethical standpoint must be free from the implications of providence and predestination. The finalistic process, once rid of these notions, belongs of right to man as his distinctive mark. Without necessarily denying a providence of the Almighty, we must regard teleology as the peculiarity of human nature (vol 1, p. 282). Now, if teleology is a distinctively human affair, it follows that an all-embracing teleology is anthropomorphic. Its all-inclusive cosmic bearing only resembles the character of man. Further, it will make man a part of the teleological framework and thus reduce his worth and dignity as an ethical being. A thorough-going cosmic teleology cancels ethics and amounts to a theory of predestination. Then, fatalism becomes the only standpoint for man (vol. 1, p 288). Moral consciousness and teleological metaphysics are thus incompatible. As ethics is bent upon not being 'corrupted by philosophy', the whole of cosmic finalism must be cast aside.

This is only one part of the argument. The basic contention against teleology is founded upon the law of categories. This is a peculiar law regarding the gradation of structures. Every higher category unifies the lower in a new way. It is a higher formation which rises over the lower making it its

material (Cf L Morgan's *Emergent Evolution*). The lower categories are more independent and unconditioned, whereas the higher are dependent upon the lower and conditioned by them. The new and higher formation can become active only within the range which the lower categories leave undetermined. The higher cannot suspend the action of the lower though it can form a higher structure only upon it. 'In short, the lower categories are the stronger, the higher are the weaker' (vol. 1 p. 289). But dependence and superiority are not antagonistic. In the graded realm of principles, it is precisely the dependent which is superior and the independent which is stronger. The higher principle is necessarily more complex and more conditioned and the lower more unconditioned and elementary. Though the lower is stronger in quantity it is poorer in quality. As such, the higher can do nothing by defying the lower, but upon the same as the basis it can create a finer grade of life in which alone lies its superiority. Teleological metaphysics subordinates the causal nexus to the finalistic. The law of categories makes the causal nexus a condition precedent to the finalistic one. Finalism can thrive only on the stable structure of a causally determined world. Thus the law of categories restores to man his special right of teleology. To give it cosmic scope and extend its range of validity is to negate the part of man. And with that ethics vanishes. A cosmic teleology with the absolute at the head of it, belittles the glory of man and leaves the world a theatre for predestination. But the causal nexus refuses to be drawn into this perspective. It is at the disposal of any power which is in a position to use it for its own willed purposes. Man can guide it by his power of foresight and self-determination, though they are limited. These limits mark the intrusion of the accidental into experience. The opposite of the accidental is not the caused, but the unforeseen. Accident is an exclusively teleological concept. 'It exists only for the teleology of man. Ontologically he is just as thoroughly determined as everything else' (vol. 1 p. 294). Human teleology is limited on the one side by man's limited power of prevision, and on the other by the great causal stream of cosmic events. The insoluble dilemmas into which moral values themselves fall, also put a limit to his teleology. 'They would set a limit to the harmony even of a divinely



perfect, of a world-ruling providence and fore-ordination' (vol. 1, p. 302).

### CRITICISM

(1) The restriction of teleology to man gives rise to some difficulties. In the first place it introduces an abrupt element into the cosmic process to explain moral phenomena. If it is true, it must carry with it the ultimate dissolution of ethics. If our life is ethical, our environment cannot be unsuited to it. There is no need for an ethical life, nor is it conceivable that it can arise, in an environment which is directly indifferent to it. The principles of its organisation must be already spiritual to help the ethical life of its inhabitants. The ultimate spiritual foundation of the universe is a postulate needed to give meaning to valuational pursuits. If the ethical being is not a product of the cosmic process, wherefrom does he hail? It is impossible to believe that matter in its automatic adventures, has, at last, produced a creature with an insight into values. A theory of ethics needs a theory of moral government which will eventually right all wrongs and save all souls. Nature may be anything, but if there is no one looking after the moral order of the world, pessimism is the only consistent standpoint. The belief in an irrevocable moral order existing in a nature that includes and transcends both is the very basis of any valuable life. Mere agnosticism about everything beyond the narrow world of man is next door to pessimism. It corrupts ethics with a fundamental doubt about its ultimate worth in a world where everything is apparently indifferent. In the long run, it ends in cynicism, because, if moral life is not strongly rooted in reality, it has a tendency to be self-defeated. Ethical life must be somehow of a piece with that which pervades the universe 'in and out'. Otherwise, our whole ethical existence is simply 'a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery'. Thus, unless human teleology bears some inherent relation to the cosmic, it cannot be understood rationally. To confine it only to man is to shut our eyes to its possibilities elsewhere. Why not the cosmic process be presumed as a part of the ethical which again issues from the spiritual nature of the real? From atom to divinity every slab of existence is spiritual. An

ethics which does not recognise this fundamental truth contains a disintegrating element within its own structure

(2) The second part of the argument contains a fallacy. Hartmann's law of categories makes the lower produce the higher which is impossible. It is a principle inherent in the nature of things, and one which no example has disproved, that the lower cannot by itself produce the higher. All evolution implies the orderly unfoldment on the plane of manifestation, of potentialities already inherent in the formative principle of that which is said to evolve. The cosmic and the human factors should have subsisted from all eternity as spiritual principles in the thought of God. Some form of teleology or other cannot be avoided in the comprehension of the nature of life. The world itself, strictly from the human standpoint, is working out a mighty teleology of which our finite minds can know only the rudiments. Life spells purpose. And such purpose is everywhere, not in man alone. If we reverse the law of categories, we understand ethical life aright. The lower must be explained in terms of the higher rather than the higher in terms of the lower. The complex can explain the simple but not the simple the complex. In the higher and the more complex gradation of categories, we see the unfolding of the essential nature of the lower and simpler forms of being. The oak explains the acorn, even more truly than the acorn the oak. There is no break or gap in the divine plan from end to end. The organic contains the *raison d'être* of the inorganic. In the rational soul of man one has to discover that for which his body is intended. With man the movement has changed. The course of progress seems to be steered inward. There is truth in the saying 'on earth there is nothing great but man in man there is nothing great but mind'. Man is the microcosm, the focal point of the universe in whom are fused different grades of reality. But, on this account, teleology is not confined to him alone. Beings lower still in the scale evidence it. All activity, mental or physical, is a sort of conative striving. Purposiveness is co-extensive with life, implying a comprehension of objectives and ends. In addition to a simple reaction to the stress of environment, each organism shows up a purpose which seems to keep it going. The impulse is called conation which is at work in the desire to maintain the species.

by providing food or seeking a mate. It is an overmastering force goading the creature to its goals. Until the accomplishment of the end, the experience is one of tension and restless elbowing out through trial and error. The salmon proceeding upstream leaping over rocks and breasting the current, in order to deposit her spawn in a particular place, is only working out its special urges. In all living creatures with a will to live, it is impossible to exaggerate the personal aspects of the facts. Wherever there is life, creatures are animated by the need to fulfil purposes and fill up wants. Foresight, expectation, restlessness are the marks of teleology in the human scale also. The universe is like an army of volunteers working together for a common destiny. We are no more separate than the leaves of a tree. Each leaf has a sufficient speck of consciousness to believe that it is an entirely separate pack of existence trading with time and dying in it in due course. But all the time, in this line of thought, it does not realise that it is being fed by the sap which flows from the trunk of the tree. Our peculiar self is similarly related to the self of the whole. Once we understand ourselves, we shall see that we are indissolubly connected with the self of the whole. There is no trivial puff of existence, no loose and disjointed member not held together in solemn kinship by the force of this universal organism. A shake in the divine nature, somewhere in the far off interior, throws the whole range of the immediate present into an agitation, which may precipitate the fall of empires that are deemed bullet-proof. Human teleology, by the very limitations Hartmann admits, demands a teleology beyond itself. Human purpose itself is a product of a higher purpose which man is reflecting. If there is a fundamental organising and regulating activity of the universe, how can anybody deny purpose to it? Thus, teleology is, from top to bottom, a principle of the universe in which we find ourselves. It is no evolute from the stratification of lower categories. If we give up the spiritual direction of the universe, we can make nothing out of anything.

## II

### ETHICS AND RELIGION

For a long time ethics drew its material from religion by setting forth its values. Hartmann assures us that the age

of such dependence is passing away. But religion is still a treasure-trove of ethical contents. Mythology also supplies a fine stock of ethical axioms dressed in more concrete forms. Religion has had an imposing career in the past. It appealed straight to the heart of man and spoke to him in the language of intuition, picture, symbol and even of artistic creation. Hartmann does not see the need for any religious back-ground to his ethics and refuses to draw God into his account. The whole prestige of religion is a matter of indifference to ethics. Behind moral theology, theological morality peeps forth. But in the full sense, man alone is the moral being and not the absolute or any other entity in the whole world. The first part of his work closes with a characteristic human note (vol. 1, p. 341). Hartmann's chief objections to religion are given in more detail in the third volume (vol. III, chapt. XXI, p. 260). The essence of morality is not a religious reward but a valuational feeling. The religious man makes God everything and fails to appreciate the autonomous character of ethics. Ethics is a cent per cent humanistic affair and has no need for a God. The essence of religion, as understood by Hartmann is laying up of treasures in heaven mortifying the flesh here. To ethics, thought of reward is trivial. Moreover, all religions do not happen to be the bearers of ethical good. The transference of guilt implied in the notion of 'Sacrifice' is repugnant to ethics. While religion regards values as commands of God, ethics regards them as self-subsistent entities capable of living on their own resources. Constant divine dictates militate against the foresight of man and abrogate his self-determination. Divine dominance leaves man fatally helpless. When all initiative and setting up of ends is transferred to the hands of God, ethics ceases forthwith. To this, he adds that the surrender of the ethos of man to God is at bottom due to fear. His most formidable objection to religion consists in its other-worldliness. He holds that religion makes this world worthless and seeks the values of the world to come. The consequence is the depreciation of our present existence and a turning away from it. Ethics celebrates this world, settles disputes in it and fulfils itself in the world around. The whole idea of salvation is a degradation from the ethical point of view. Hence religion and ethics are irreconcilable.

## CRITICISM

(1) This is a piece of incisive indictment. The phenomena of the moral consciousness are incompatible with cosmic teleology. From this follow, according to Hartmann, a series of consequences which ultimately end in the removal of ethics from any religious leaning. The only point about it is, that an ethics which plays second-fiddle to religion is bound to pass out of its own sphere and thus lose its individuality in due course. Ethics is likely to be left without an independent prop sooner or later. Then, it will have to transcend itself into a higher synthesis which can no longer be called ethics, or declare itself still autonomous even in the face of this need. Hartmann chooses to hold the brief for the autonomy of ethics at the cost of its final fulfilment. He treated the science all through, as if it were an independent one completely indifferent to all other questions regarding the ultimate nature of the universe. A simple scrutiny of the nature and content of our moral consciousness cannot stand on a scientific footing without going deep into its primal foundations. It is impossible to know ethics fully without knowing metaphysics and theology. An ethics put on its own legs will have the same status as sociology or economics. The one question that should be directly put to a moralist is: Can a man logically believe in moral obligation who regards the world as the resultant of some senseless clashing of atoms without end or aim? If a man's morality, after all, depends on his philosophy, there is no point in denying it. Ethics, as a science, must hark back to its metaphysical foundations and draw out its appeal from that source. A man who doubts or denies this may still be moral, but, with him, ethics does not carry the same meaning that it does to the man who regards it as an expression of the spiritual nature of reality.

(2) Hartmann is only following the entire argument of contemporary agnosticism and positivism in dealing with ethics as a self-complete science with its gaze firmly fixed on the phenomenal alone. His view of human nature is broad and deep as is shown in his analysis of values, but what it wants is logical clearness and coherence. No one can deny that there is a moral as well as an intellectual reality. That moral life

as such is independent of any theoretical understanding of it is also practically seen. But what we cannot believe is that this independence is absolute and ultimate. If the good is not also the true, the fabric of man's ethical life collapses with its inside fittings. One cannot permanently live on ethical insights that do not hold good beyond the grave. If in living the ethical life, one feels the conviction that he is touching the depths of the spiritual nature of life itself, his ethics cannot be easily undermined. An ethics kept in strict check by agnosticism as to the ultimates can never rise higher than secular utility. The ethical and intellectual man cannot long be kept apart. The battle between good and evil cannot be eternal. Ultimately, we demand an intellectual justification of our ethical life, a theory of it in relation to a metaphysics which demonstrates its need. If we deny the spiritual directions and constitution of the universe, there is no need for ethics. With it, it goes down to the level of a social science. If we do not see in the good man the image of God, we have missed the essence of morality. The roots of reverence and hope are deep in the absolute goodness which is reflected in evolved human beings with a greater degree of clarity. If the human goodness is the original and not a copy of the divine goodness, its power of appeal is feeble and its final worth is a matter of opinion. The moral structure of our life rests upon its ultimate spiritual constitution. It should be a definite postulate of ethics. Without this assumption, moral life becomes a life based on empirical claims. The objectivity of moral judgments can never be established. The real knowledge that our yearning ideals are the everlasting real is a persuasion necessary for the soul to behold its own grandeur. The secret of the moral life lies in its appeal to supreme reality. As Martineau put it 'The rule of right, the symmetries of character, the requirements of perfection, are no provincialisms of this planet, they are known among the stars, they are signs beyond Orion and the Southern cross, they are whatever the universal spirit is' (*Study of Religion*, vol 1, p 26). The ideal is no mere fancy of the 'Winged imagination' but the gleaming face of the real. Behind the 'ought' lies the 'is'. Behind our restless 'ought-to be' lies the eternal pulse-beat of the divine harmony in which nothing is unfulfilled. Its human side is morality. No one can

bear the full vision of the absolute Without a touch of this transcendental beauty, ethics degenerates in the long run into first-rate secularism

(3) It is a simple mistake to attribute religion to fear A glance at the history of the world will show that the men who ever exhibited super-human courage are those that never lacked a faith in the ultimate goodness of God Even a staunch exponent of ethical autonomy will not deny that Buddha and Christ stand out as the best ethical exemplars of the human race A prince that left his empire in search of Truth through all its ascetic disciplines and the son of a carpenter who bore with divine dignity the cross for a purpose he believed right, are not expected to suffer from the 'fear complex' It is decisively false to hold that religion is based on fear; the proper view is to regard it as an expression of hope No truly religious man experiences fear and all history is a witness to it.

(4) It is a pity that Hartmann could not find in religion anything more than an indecent concern for the treasures of heaven This only re-opens the problem of rewards The question is, are all the prizes of the moral life blanks? This is a vital issue which a consistent theory of ethics cannot escape If the just man is unhappy, ethics is a fool's game That is why, even a strict stoic like Kant made a characteristic statement on the matter The ultimate issue of goodness, as all must admit, must be happiness The outward and inward fortunes of the soul must be proportionate This is the Kantian argument for the existence of God as the moral ruler of the world The distribution of rewards must be guided by the principle of individual deserts There must be a final equation of virtue and happiness A disinterested ethics is a fiction For Kant, the equation of virtue and happiness is a postulate of morality There are gaps in the ethical theory of Hartmann which can be filled up only by some such suggestion of the Kantian sort If the rulers of the universe prefer the unjust man to the just man, it is better to die in the act of vindicating justice than live and be convinced that justice is everywhere defeated. The greatest tragedy of the soul is when it loses faith in God and goodness and yet lives in a desolate world, for fear of dying before death actually occurs As Sidgwick

points out 'when a man passionately refuses to believe that the wages of virtue can be dust, it is often less from any private reckoning of his own wages than from a disinterested aversion to a universe so fundamentally irrational, that good for the individual is not ultimately identified with universal good' As such, a religious hypothesis of ultimate fulfilment for one and all, according to merits, is logically needed to prevent a contradiction in one of the fundamental branches of human thought Nobody is wise in serving anything or anybody without a hope of reward Nor is life so constituted as to permit such folly It is a way of deceiving ourselves if we think that we are doing anything without a hope of return Honesty will compel us to admit that we are loving God because it is the only proof against foolery Even in the so-called disinterested search for truth, there is already a consciousness that truth is more valuable than falsehood 'Morality for morality's sake' is as ineffective as the cry 'art for art's sake' which became a fashion with the Victorian aesthetes Considering moral life on all sides, there is a need for adjourning to a future to achieve the harmony of virtue and happiness If the sole reward of man's moral life consists in a noble bearing of adversity, we can forthwith declare that the Good is the biggest irony of life On Hartmann's view, moral life would be a life lived in the pursuit of ideals which we are going to embody for a short time, to be handed over at the gates of exit without a tear Such stoicism is entirely outside the pale of human achievement If each man is not destined to get his due in the end, the moral life turns into an injustice to oneself and a sentimental reverence of the moving ironies in the guise of values

(5) It is unsound to hold that ethics is self-complete. To fence ethical phenomena all round, it is not necessary to put back religion in a wrong place God is no enemy of man even as man is no rebel against God Hartmann is wrong in thinking that religion is chiefly given to the depreciation of this life and ethics to its affirmation The fact is, religion looks to this life as a part of the beyond It is committed to a life that is not merely temporal but eternal also The other-worldliness implied in religion is a motive present in all higher pursuits. This 'solid seeming earth' is a ridiculous piece of



caricature before the glory and promise of the ideal. We are all living in counter worlds by the special equipments we possess. Where we rise to real levels of excellence we impose on the crude inchoate world a form more worthy of the dignity of man. The ideal is a call from eternity, a faint anamnesis of the perfection that timelessly is. Neither ethics nor religion is complete if confined to a fragmentary life that does not go beyond time and space. Religion is a more restless idealism than ethics and its quest is deeper and wider. Ethical life has no motive beyond the adjustment of claims and counter-claims and the holding of their balance rightly. Once a humanistic Utopia is realised, ethics must needs transcend itself into a higher aesthetic experience. If value and existence are correlated, its pursuit must somewhere lead us to God. No philosopher could ever dismiss the notion of God though he could destroy all false Gods. A secular view of life fails on many points. A little reflection on the transitoriness of finite life and its inequalities and uncertainties, together with the antinomies involved in all that is relative, cannot help putting us on the path of God-seeking. An ethics that is confined to the here and now cannot rise above the level of worldliness. We must have stronger anchor-holds for meeting the profounder needs of the human spirit. The merely fluctuating claims of a changing world can be met by changing morals. This life is actually nothing when the spirit is fully touched with the glory of the finest issues. To live under the spell of the vision splendid is itself blessedness. Happiness is based on the firm anchorage of thought and conduct beyond time and change. It is religion that gives us the hope to stand at our posts even when everything goes wrong in the world of ceaseless change. It is easy to put aside the eternal as childish, but the most difficult thing is to understand anything without the hypothesis of God. The human mind cannot cling long to the vice of departmentalisation. Sooner or later it bursts bounds and expands into a grasp of life as a whole. The other-worldliness of religion has never been to the detriment of this world and it is only the fruit of its great skill and patience for deep mining. Far from being an escape from the evils of this world, it is a message of hope and redemption. A worthy religion must also be a creative and spiritual energy that works in social life.

backed up by an inward peace and a divine sense of justice. The heart of creative religion is ethical and aesthetic mysticism. Religion is communion with all that is divine. It incarnates and stabilises value. It captures the peace and beauty that characterise the 'free man'. Efforts at the overthrow of religion only changed its outer garb without touching its inner essence. Buddha laughed at all the Gods with the result that the Buddhists made him a God. The stuff of all true religion is indestructible. Life is mostly dull prose and hard routine and its meaning must be found in religion. If it cannot play the lute, lull our world weariness and compose for us the ballad of a Pilgrim's Progress, our acute sufferings and cruel tensions lose all their significance. An enlightened religion intuits the imperishable oneness of all life. With the intuition of this oneness, the moral man would participate in the valuational wealth of this world. Our passage through the temporal is temporary. We feel the sense of a grand happening here and now because our destiny is grander than its minor struggles. A life simply trivial in itself takes on the grandeur of an epic with the ingression of a religious feeling. An ethics without this colour and strength of conviction is a poor Science that appeals to human mercy and earns its living in a stern world by exploiting the soft moods of man.

(6) An ethics that has no vision beyond the phenomenal is a failure. An all too mundane view of life without any appreciation of its ultimate destiny is bound to end in secular hedonism and, consequent on its failure, in pessimism. The drama of salvation is an esoteric motive in the kernel of the human heart and specially in the unlocked depths of its pains. In the wealth of moods that are scattered over modern life, there is the evidence of a great psychological breakdown. The modern intellect is caught up in a tug between man's primal need for salvation and the pride of his learning which has never matured into wisdom. A redemption up from the depths into a profound illumination becomes increasingly evident as we go on living. The nature of life is such that at no stage is it satisfied with its previous achievement. A feeling for 'eternal blessedness' touches the finest portions of the spirit through our major and minor tragedies. The craving for salvation into a state of immortal blessedness squares more with the findings of the

intellect and the logic of the heart than the notion that it is ethically degrading. The need for divine grace is everywhere manifest throughout creation. He who never felt that he was in bondage and that he should get rid of it sooner or later is leagues away from the supreme truth of life. On the principle of the higher explaining the lower, it is only the religious that can explain the ethical life. An ethics which keeps its distance from religion is for ever incomplete, because it can never overcome its antinomies from its own standpoint. Since ethics can never be an end in itself, and can never go beyond the notion of good and evil, its very limitations bar it from self-completion. There must be universal restoration as the final goal of human endeavour. Everyone must ultimately find his way to his true home for 'they also serve who only stand and wait'. There can be no eternal discord in the music of the spheres. There can be no unfulfilled work. Our life on earth can be nothing more than an incidental background to a higher drama of salvation under the presidency of God. If only all this tragedy, loss of life, decay of old hopes appeals to us to seek for a fineness beyond this faded earth, each of our personal tragedies can be cheerfully borne as a persuasive agent of the divine hand towards the 'peace and beauty that passeth understanding'. In the words of the Poet Browning

'There shall never be one lost good !

What was shall live as before,  
The evil is null, is nought, is  
Silence implying sound  
What was good shall be good,  
With, for evil, so much good more,  
On the earth the broken arcs,  
In heaven a perfect round '

## PART IV

### MORAL VALUES IN GENERAL

#### I

#### INTRODUCTION

The first part of Hartmann's work is a prolegomena strictly metaphysical in character. The second part is a concrete and comprehensive unfoldment of the content of moral values. It is an endeavour to express a way of understanding human virtues and their place in the formation of moral personality. Perhaps, it is the most important book ever published in this branch of study. The great power of analysis he displays, his broad purview and subtle insight into the heart of human nature, and the aptitude of his specially coined terminology, are all overwhelmingly brilliant. The three volumes are not necessarily connected and each can be studied on its own account, though, doubtless, a conjoint study of the three furnishes us with an up-to-date posting in the great tradition of Ethical Realism. Though the first and last part may be proved to be of no permanent value in course of time, even those who do not agree with Hartmann's standpoint will have no hesitation in pronouncing that the second part is a masterpiece of Ethical workmanship, which no advanced student of the subject can afford to neglect. Starting from moral values as being nearest and best-known, he assigns their scales and gradings in a systematic scheme. After defining ethical values and marking them off from goods and situational values generally, he gives us in a series of sections, an exquisite study of ancient and modern virtues. There lies behind the whole effort, a generous taste unwarped by freaks or fads which gives it a value that transcends its more restricted aim.

#### THE PLACE OF MORAL VALUES

The term value is conspicuous in economics. In a broad sense, it is true to say that all existence falls under the category of values and that in the perspective of ethics everything has some worth or other. Moral values are different from goods values or situational values. Material goods have a goods-value.

The possession of them is a situational value (vol 11, p 24). Moral values are attached to the acts of persons 'Only acts of persons can be morally good or bad' (vol 11, p 24) Moral acts show the motivated intentions of persons to persons. Though the intentions miscarry, it is only the intention and the disposition or personal attitude that goes with it that are judged to be good or bad. Though Hartmann criticises Kant's subjectivism, formalism, and intellectualism, on this point, he is at one with him. The good which confronts us in every situation is never single or complete. Clinging to each possible resolution is a group of goods, each having the same claim to be realised in one and the same place. Moral conflict is a peculiar happening. If it were between good and bad simply, the problem is already settled, because moral life would be the following of a given rule. Every situation in life happens to be the balance between good and good. Values are ceaselessly pitted against values. We are forced into the conflict and invited to do violence to one member of the opposition, as both cannot be, at the same time and in the same place. This is the height of ethical tragedy, to see the good and yet be compelled to sacrifice the same for another good. In every situation, a variety of values participate. There is a consciousness which weighs value against value. The nature of moral values is closely connected with their grading. To know values apart from value-relations is not possible. Without knowledge of their relation to one another, all knowledge of values remains abstract. The concrete sense of value is only a sense of its rank in a finite value-scheme. Immediately with the feeling for the value, a feeling for its place in the value scale is also experienced. When Socrates said that no one does evil for its own sake, he only meant that one always does only a good which hovers before his vision. Christian ethics places man under the spell of a lower power which robs him of all moral determination (vol. 11, p 46). But this swerving, as a matter of fact, does not exist in man, though he is often overborne by the insistent strength of the lower values. In every concrete situation, through the mere juxtaposition of persons interested in the same goods, a condition is so given that every act, even every inner attitude, falls at the same time under moral points of view (vol 11, p. 47). The consciousness of higher and

wer is utterly decisive. The morally selective consciousness value is necessarily a consciousness of the scale of values. Immediately with the feeling for the value, there must be a feeling for its place in the scale' (vol. II, p. 46). The value sensibility is primal and constitutes the corner-stone of moral discriminations. The quality tones of values constitute a complex scale with the middle reaches alone accessible to ethical discernment at present. The realm of values being an organised one, the task of ethics is to discover by empirical scrutiny the specific relations that specific values bear to one another.

### THE CRITERIA OF VALUES

Five characteristics given by Scheler are examined by Hartmann in this connection as affording some guidance in the gradation of values.

(1) One value is higher than another in so far as it is more enduring. The super-temporality, timelessness of the value quality itself is what is meant. Moral qualities do not stand or fall with the act in which they inhere. For example, love has meaning only '*sub specie quadam aeterni*'.

(2) That value is higher which is less subject to losing its instinctive quality by being shared. Thus, while material goods divide men who share them, spiritual goods unite them in the same act. Moral forces tend to unite all and scorn strife. The mode of their being is one for all.

(3) Though the basic moral value is stronger, the value dependent upon it is superior (vol. I, p. 251). Superiority and dependence are not antagonistic. The lower values are more basic and fundamental while the higher values are qualitatively superior.

(4) A value which gives greater depth of satisfaction is higher. A solid material satisfaction is superficial when compared to the elusive touch of art. The stoic indifference to outer fortunes is only the inward concentration on the imperturbable life in the depth of feeling for the highest value. Indifference to lower values is the reverse side of this strong attitude.

(5) An indication of worth-level consists in the degree of relativity to some specific value-sense. Moral values are self-subsistent personal qualities with no relativity to the value-sense of anybody. They are absolute. In the feeling for values

there exists an immediate consciousness of this absoluteness, in which the higher autonomy of these manifests itself. They are superior to goods values or to material values. The superior character of moral values is a matter of direct experience. The realm of values is unique with its own structures. The superiority of the moral values over the economic or biological ones is definitely sensed in the feeling itself which is the organ of valuational Intuition (vol. II, chap. IV, pp. 54, 64).

Hartmann observes that these distinguishing marks do not take us beyond a general outline. These no doubt enable us to distinguish between the more obvious classes of values, but they are not fine enough to decide differences of grade within the same class. For this purpose, these tests are too crude and the indication of the value-level too summary. Ethics is only concerned with finer discriminations. Super-temporality, indivisibility, dependence and axiological absoluteness are common to all the moral values proper. These four features evidently constitute marks common to the whole class. Depth of satisfaction is a great help. In honesty, truthfulness, goodwill or self-sacrifice etc., an increasing depth of inner assent seems to follow the review. But the kind of satisfaction varies qualitatively. By way of qualitative discrimination, a much finer perception of gradation can be attained. In the Nicomachean ethics, the valuational predicates are graduated according to rank in a moral scale. 'Not bad', 'worthy of praise', 'beautiful', 'worthy of honour', 'lovable', 'admirable', 'superb', form a series. The corresponding negatives are 'defective', 'not beautiful', 'blameworthy', 'disgraceful', and 'hateful'. Each series is further differentiated by an abundance of finer shades. Though the table of Aristotle is by no means perfect or exhaustive, it is a model for us (vol. II, pp. 56, 57). There must be a primal feeling of difference of rank which corresponds to the type of response. This must be as original as the feeling itself which discriminates qualitatively (vol. II, p. 59). The feeling of relation of height among values adheres to the primal feeling for value in such a way, that in any given case, the height of different values is easily sensed. Every concrete sense of value is primarily related to a scale of values. All living valuational feeling comes under laws of preference which are embedded in the order of valuational essences. This relationality

of feeling resolves itself precisely into the relation of 'higher' and 'lower'. This is called 'the axiological perception of height' (vol. II, p. 63). It is the perception of an ideal scale *sui generis*. Pascal's phrase 'ordre du coeur' expresses the same. The phenomenon of preference is not apprehensible without a momentary deepening of devotion and a more attentive listening. As a fleeting phenomenon, it must be carefully hearkened to in its faintest whispers. Otherwise, it can be injured by rough handling. No human need of unity or a philosophical need of a system can change this circumstance. As such, the scale of values must remain a mere fragmentary work as compared to the philosophical knowledge of values (vol. II, p. 64).

#### NO SUPREME VALUE

In Volume I, a number of historical ethical systems have been examined. They are shown to err through a one-sided emphasis on some values at the expense of others. Attention has been drawn to the error involved in the view that man possesses a knowledge of good and evil. Nietzsche was the first to explode this ancient myth. Man has not become as God, knowing good and evil. 'To this day he does not know what good and evil are. More accurately, he knows only little about them, only fragments.' For 'the good' is not as most philosophical theories hold 'the absolute unit of the morally valued'. Values are many. 'Their realm is a manifoldness, and we know neither the entire manifoldness nor its unity' (vol. I, pp. 83-4). Then, if there is a unity of good, it cannot be the unity of a single principle. It must only be a unity of system. But, even this assumption is a difficult matter, as there is no empirical evidence for it. The values of experience cannot be ordered in a linear scheme. We cannot even actually discriminate a more complexly articulated system, but only the inter-dependence and gradations of certain groups of value. As many of the values stand in antinomic relation to each other, it seems to preclude all possibility of a higher synthesis. But as system is a postulate of all coherent thinking, we can find it in ethics, in our recognition of the categorical character of obligation and in our ethical judgments. This presupposition should not be taken as setting aside the conflict in concrete situations. A monism of ethics must allow for a pluralism of morals. Its



principle of unity can have no more than the regulative function of an idea (vol. II, ch. V)

Ethics always tended to assume a supreme value. It sometimes sought it in the strongest and the most elemental and sometimes in the highest of values. The ethics of pleasure, happiness, self-preservation and the Kantian ethics of universality have upheld the supremacy of the elemental. The ethics of Justice, neighbour love, universal love, have all stressed the supremacy of the axiologically highest value. But they are wrong. Ethics must always allow for an incurable pluralism as regards contents. The Platonic 'idea of the good' is an ethical idea devoid of definite content and lacking in distinctive marks. The idea of supreme value remains empty and affords no ethical insight. Even if it is agreed that the good is the centre of ethical values, nothing is settled thereby. It was Plotinus who said that the Good is 'beyond the power of human thought'. The question has relevancy for practical purposes, if it means that a plurality of values is self-contradictory. Obviously, it is not the case. A systematic co-ordination of diverse values can exist without culminating in one supreme point. Unity of the system is in no way dependent on the focal unity or the supreme value sought for. Even in the domain of existential categories, the ultimate which can be discovered is not a single ruling principle but a whole stratum of principles. All monisms are of a purely constructive nature. They issue out of a logical craving for unity. Again, the desired unity of values need not be a value itself. The principle of motion need not be motion itself, of life, life, and of knowledge, knowledge itself. Similarly, the universally ruling principle of the realm of value can very well be something else than value (vol. II, pp. 66-72). There is no reason, why the supreme value, in the sense of giving the values their inner unity, should itself be value. On the whole, ethics should leave this problem unsolved, keeping all possibilities open. A desired unity should not commit itself to a monism of value, in the given multiplicity of morals. But, it can surely hold by a monism of ethics, in the variety of values. 'Nothing in the realm of values is more concealed than just this central principle (the good) which is assumed by all morality as self-evident, but which in truth is everywhere differently understood' (vol. II, p. 67).

## CRITICISM

In holding fast by a pluralism of values, Hartmann provides a counter-point to one-value morality. A one-value morality often degrades into fanaticism and easily forgets its own purposes. But is not a supreme value, at the same time, a fundamental postulate of ethics? If there is a higher and lower, there must be the highest and the lowest also, otherwise, the phrase 'axiological perception of height' has no meaning. Again, a man cannot walk in two directions or serve two masters. In the pursuit of all that is valuable, one is only realising the unity of the supreme value which alone is giving meaning to all other values. For example, supreme in Plato's Metaphysical hierarchy of forms is 'the form of the Good' transcending knowledge and being. He himself admitted that there is no writing of his on this subject since it is not capable of being expressed like the other branches of knowledge. The good formed the goal of all Plato's intellectual endeavour. There must be a supreme value to give unity and system to the whole domain of values, harmonising their antinomies in one sovereign and universal purpose. Otherwise striving disintegrates itself in a variety of antithetical pursuits. Our many pursuits can have significance, only when we realise that their initial frictions are bound to be transcended ultimately in the supreme value. Otherwise, plainly, none of our pursuits has any intrinsic worth. If we are unable to fill up the picture of the supreme value, it is because we have not transcended the sphere of valuational conflict. Our inability to outline the supreme good need not mean its non-existence. Every value has value, only because it finally carries us beyond the conflict and kindles in us the yearning for the supreme value. Though he has not looked at this problem in this light, Hartmann incidentally brings out the need for appreciating the variety and richness of moral life. Most moralities have an aggressive tendency to usurp power and set up valuational dictatorship. A man pledged to one and only one ideal, without knowing its relations to other ideals, is blind to the multidimensional richness of moral life. Every faddist is a strange case of pathology. Most of those who think that they are leading moral lives overlook the number of possibilities that bloom by the wayside.

Idealism without understanding and realism without capacity are sources of all mischief in the world. An appreciation of the abundant wealth of life adds more tolerance and goodwill to it out of its own fulness.

## II

### VALUES AS ANTINOMIC

Just as categories involve one another, so do values, though the nature of their implication is different. Some sort of correlation runs throughout the entire domain. Negative values are specially more closely related than the positive ones. Vices go hand in hand more than virtues. Ethical opposition, being a more complex one than the Ontological, is on a different footing. In dealing with this aspect of the question, the author once again brings to bear afresh, the insight of Aristotelian ethics. In every value, at some point, there is a catch which brings about a unique qualitative transformation. What originally was the condition of a good life becomes the basis of a bad one. The values of health, courage, etc., good in themselves, may pave the way for a fall. Any virtue set full speed ends in vice. Even truthfulness, a highly praised virtue, if adopted absolutely, only causes irreparable losses to those around. A good turns out to be a bad in so far as it disregards its complementary good. There is again an unavoidable opposition between complementary goods, as these claims conflict at some point or other. At the same time, in so far as a claim has a significant ethical stamp, it must bear essential reference to a complementary claim. This antinomic relation is evident in the case of justice and love. Justice is impersonal, mechanical and cold. Love is personal, spontaneous and warm. We do not like to be judged by those whom we love or love those who judge us. Lovers are proverbially blind and judges are proverbially strict. They are genuine contraries, if not polar opposites. Yet, they are also complementary, because, justice without love is itself injustice. By a fetish of principles, it is easy to forget the great motives of life. Love without justice terminates in a fateful attachment that sees no other's point. If it is open to one value, it is dead to ten others. It places faith in the place of reason and reigns reckless of results. Valuational opposites constitute a system of possible diversity.

with more than one dimension. Each contrast is in itself a dimension and indeed a completely positive continuum. The dimensions interpenetrate and cross each other constituting a dimensional system 'Thus in the realm of values there is something like an ideal positional system of possible values a sort of intelligible space' (vol II, p 78) The dimensional system of opposites is an ideal 'valuational space' A real antinomy is struck when it is beyond synthesis When we find an irresolvable antinomy we have finally come upon the ultimately irrational and tragic in ethical life The case of purity versus maturity is a typical example There can be no genuine synthesis here as the movement from the one to the other is irreversible A sophisticated man's desire to regain the lost paradise of a child's nature is doomed to be a sad longing There is an antinomy between activity and inertia, simplicity and complexity, universality and singularity etc On the 'further side' of moral values, there is antinomy between ethics and Religion Hartmann regards the conflict between them as so fundamental that ethics must postulate atheism But here again, one must avoid the error of treating as ultimate the thesis of an antinomy, which as its status indicates may be no more than a half truth (vol III, pp 273-74) Values sometimes present such a tragic conflict, that the agent cannot escape from the taint of guilt, for, a greater guilt is incurred by fighting shy of the issue, than by facing it out straightforwardly (vol II, p 208) But though such antinomies are insoluble at our present stage of experience, it does not follow that the antithetical values are necessarily on a par of complete equality Though he denies the possibility of discovering a principle of synthesis, he cannot resist the temptation to speculate on the direction in which it should be sought With this he refers us back to the Aristotelian Doctrine of the 'Golden mean' The Golden mean does not represent the Good as merely the commonplace average Each of Aristotle's antithetical disvalues stand in opposition to a distinct value The Aristotelian virtue is a synthesis of two valuable, but in themselves one sided qualities Thus *σωφροσύνη* (Sophrosyne) is in opposition to licentiousness, self-control, as against apathy, it is the normal ability to react emotionally The virtue opposed to irascibility is mildness, but against the extreme of spiritlessness,

it becomes the capacity to feel righteous indignation. But all this is only a possible speculation (vol. II, pp. 414, 432)

### CRITICISM

An ideal synthesis of values is an ever receding impracticability in actual experience. The whole of moral life is based upon a basic contradiction. Moral values, so long as they do not transcend their antinomies have no claim to finality. To solve these antinomies the golden mean is no clue, since in the very ideal synthesis it seeks, it is again pitted against an equally strong synthesis of disvalues. Take the case of moderation. Is it not always opposed to excess? To resolve the antinomies you must transcend the antinomy. In the sphere of antinomy if not this, the other one takes its place. For the fulfilment of the moral life, speculative minds must turn to a different quarter. A strictly philosophical mind must run over the moral life quickly and lose itself in a higher harmony to escape logical contradictions. Though Bradley's central thesis is correct, he went wrong in speaking of the moral life as based upon the two incompatible ideals of self-sacrifice and self-assertion (*Appearance and Reality*, pp. 414 and 415). No one follows either, moral life is based upon the pursuit of the Ideal only. Self-sacrifice and self-assertion are not the points at issue, though they form a formidable pair of antinomies. The Ideal must be a finished and faultless sample of perfection. We pursue neither our self-seeking nor our self-sacrifice but the Ideal itself. The Ideal should not contain any contradiction; otherwise, it lacks perfection. The Spinozistic phrase '*Amor Dei intellectualis*' expresses this. Applying the principle of non-contradiction and perfection, moral values are seen to lack still something. The conflict between Good and Good is itself the first contradiction implied in moral life. Ethical tragedy is the deliberate turning down of one good in favour of another as if it were no good but evil itself. As such, every good is also an evil on the sly. If this is a fact, where is finality in this preference? All moral values lose their worth at a certain point. The so-called Goods and Virtues, on a wider view, can never be conceived without a complementary train of vices and evils. Ethics is only a valuable preface to the grasp of the ideal. The antinomic structure of values always presses ethics

forward into a higher phase of critical enquiry. When we pay off our obligations, our moral doing and undoing coincide. The end of moral life is *Nirvāna*. Ethics is not rendered farcical, because, it cannot hold its sway for ever. There are more permanent concerns of the soul, more abiding goals that lure it away from its false tangles. In the end, all phases of life are drawn into an eternal moment of *Nirvāna* filled with beauty and peace. The drawbacks in the merely moral life must be set right in the finale of human destiny.

### III

#### ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS

The realm of ethical values is an organised material continuum or more correctly a series of continua. The task of ethics is to discover their inter-relations. The values pursued, as distinguished from the values of the intention or disposition, are not themselves moral values. 'The end of straightforwardness is not to be straightforward for oneself, but that the man to whom one speaks may learn the truth' (vol 11, p 31). The values which in our ethical life we aim at realising are not moral but situational values. We induce a moral order into the relations of Goods to persons in social contexts. Moral values proper presuppose, as a requisite for their actualisation, these Goods and situational values. Thus, honesty presupposes things worth stealing and persons who suffer on that account. If property has no value, there would be no temptation to steal it or own it at another's expense. If Goods have no value the occasion for honesty and dishonesty also ceases. Situations can exist on their own account independently of moral values, but moral values cannot exist in their own value independently of situations. From the standpoint of intrinsic worth, of course, moral value is completely independent of any external reference. But, from the standpoint of its actualisation, it presupposes the actuality of existing situations possessing a value of some kind or other (vol 11, p 24). We have already noticed the inter-relation and stratification of the axiological realm by a comparison with the ontological structures of categories (vol 1, p 251). Any graded system of *a priori* principles must present a definite categorical formation. In Hartmann's system, dependence and superiority are not antagonistic to each

other. It is rather the categorical law upon which his whole system of values is based. The higher principle is always the more complex, more conditioned and as such weaker. The lower is always the more unconditioned and more general, and as such stronger (vol 1, p. 251). Material and situational values are the simplest and most unconditioned, immediate and essential. That is why the most grievous transgressions are those against the lowest values, though the greatest moral deserts attach to the highest values. In the sphere of goods values, it is clear that a loss of material goods is in general a more serious matter than a loss of spiritual goods. A threat to life and limb is grave though mere life on that account is not the highest Good. The fulfilment of the lower takes unconditional precedence, because, with its violation, the higher also is put under risk. There is a universal condemnation of the violation of such values as life and property, respect for which is unconditional. Moral and spiritual values being finer and more complicated in pattern, are more dependent. As such, they present only a weaker claim. A mere failure in friendship and untrustworthiness, though moral defects, are not crimes. Nevertheless, their qualitative superiority is sensed in the feeling of approbation that they generally bring. The realisation of the lower is the bare minimum, upon which the higher can thrive (vol 11, p. 53). Moral values are all through dependent upon the non-moral values of the material goods or human situations. The distinction between the moral and the non-moral values is, of course, fundamental, as drawing the line between ethics and economics. Apart from economic values, morality has no basis to work upon. The connection of the non-moral values (goods values, economic, situational, etc) with the moral values is not merely an outward one, but is 'essential, inward and material' (vol 11, p. 24). 'It is an unequivocal irreversible dependence of the higher upon the lower' (vol 11, p. 25). Where the lower value is weak, the higher has no place. Bodily hunger means the loss of manly pride and spiritual dignity also. But we do not, of course, regard a person as specially worthy because he respects property or attends regularly to his bodily needs. Here, the elementary value is the stronger and the value dependent upon it is the superior.

## CRITICISM

The utter dependence of the moral on the non-moral values for actualisation is one of the solid points of the new ethics. In the law of Categories, Hartmann supplies the key to the ethics of socialism. Hitherto, it is only socialism that has realised that bodily weakness means the weakness of the spirit also and that poverty means the loss of pride and with that all the noble vanity in the human being. One can afford to neglect music and painting until the whole of society is safe on its most elementary side. An ethics without economics, though theoretically possible, is a practical tragedy. Hartmann has moved into the centre of his thesis this critical note of socialism. As such, he must admit that the pursuit of a higher value, when a lower value is unsatisfied, is a sin against morality. The study of economics through ethics, and ethics through economics, is a fresh field of research which contemporary social sciences must undertake, to reconstruct the ethico-economic basis of civilised life. The truth is, everyone is in a false position in a society until his possibilities are realised. We are all ready to do the other man down at the slightest provocation. For the most part we drift with the society into which we are born. The worst of us are the wise in our generation, who make the best of its accidents without changing its morals. Intellectualism can never get on on easy terms with plutocracy and snobbery. We are badly brought up without love for each other and spoiled by economic causes. In all ages there have been selfish pleas for economic inequality which is the source of all unjust delight. A drastic spring-clearance of the businessman's civilisation, with a pervasive human sympathy and a shrewd insight into the realities of economic and political life is the need of the hour. The Victorian era of self-complacency has drawn to a close. The present depression is too keen and its implications for the future of our race too vast. The efforts of our modern industry and of the financial arrangements associated with it are ruinous to a considerable portion of society. In this great century of gloom, we have to seek with vision and courage the technique by which the good life may be made possible on this earth, once again. The dividing up of our wealth on ethical lines is the first condition of organised society. It needs



nobody to convince us today that our system of distribution is wildly wrong. We have million-dollar-fops side by side with paupers worn out by unrewarded drudgery. The problem of all civilised countries today is only the problem of distribution of wealth. If God is the ultimate Maker of everything, all we have a right to do with our production is to feed his sacred limbs. The question is only ethical. We have to produce enough for all of us on one side and prevent the theft of this produce by a few on the other. Fortunately, the problem of production has been solved for us by science. It is now for the social sciences, under the Captaincy of Ethics, to solve the problem of distribution. Intelligence is soon bound to revolt against every form of waste, taking the badge of power in the long run, to bear down the bars that lie in its way. The ethical world does not arise until the economic world is already born. In a life in which the best draw a blank and stand aghast at the ways of man, ethics is only a mask and a decoy. The life that lacks material success can have no other virtue left in it, except a secret envy of the more fortunate and a vague dread of the days ahead. Defeatism and dissolutionment are not wisdom though we pass from pain to profundity. The move towards the new social order must be rapid, otherwise the moral man will perish in an immoral society. At the same time, we have to note that the higher values should not be surrendered to the claims of the commonplace. Dialectic materialism fails to appreciate the beauties of the higher life. Life has no meaning so long as it is a competitive struggle. The vainest of us elevate a simple desire for social success into a gripping elemental passion and spoil the beauty of a really good life. Marxism made a crude appeal to the economic interests of man and failed in its faith in him. A true ethico-economic philosophy should never lose sense of the depth and dignity of human nature. Life is nerve-racking and distracting until the conditions of its survival are secured. Economic materialism must be discarded with good grace once its part is over. Man is an eternal dreamer who does not 'live by bread alone'. History is nothing but the poignant record of man's moral struggles at self-creation in the line of his ideals. Our duty at present is not so much before God as before our own fellow human beings. When we take a bird's-eye view of the way

humanity has travelled up till now, its many side turnings and meanderings, we become a little sad about the probable destiny of a race that has produced the Buddha and the Christ. If we are wiser for this sadness, there is hope for man and hope in the future.

## PART V

### SPECIFIC MORAL VALUES

#### (1) THE GOOD

The differentia of Moral values lies in its connection with freedom. Individuals assume responsibility in their regard and are held accountable for actions flowing from them. They also experience a sense of guilt over lapses and satisfaction over fulfilments. The specific quality called 'Goodness' is not, of course, by any means the whole of moral value, nor even its last unit in the scale. It is, on the other hand, at the very basis of moral life and contains the bare minimum of morality. Though the loftier achievements of personality, heroism and moral greatness are not meant for all, it is expected of everyone that he will be good. The orientation of our personal life according to the scale of values is the objective ideal of goodness. As such, it forms a fundamental moral claim made on everybody. Though moral grandeur is not expected of everybody, it is expected, that one and all will be good within the scope of each one's ethos. The chief mark of goodness is the preference of a higher value to one lower in the scale. The mark of disvalue, of badness, is the preference of the lower value to the higher. Here is contained the open suggestion, that every voluntary act is directed only to the realisation of a good of some kind. The Socratic dictum that nobody does evil for its own sake contains the clue. A Satanic being, making evil as such his good, is an axiological impossibility. Since the primary feeling of value is a feeling not of a single value alone, but of values, as partially related and roughly graded, it is possible to pursue values and yet not escape guilt. To be moral, one need not aim at the highest alone. As each act refers to a specific situation, the moral demand relates only to the highest within the scope of the same. Moral goodness

is realised in man, only as the value of rightly directed behaviour (vol 11, pp. 171-91)

## (2) LIFE AS A VALUE

All higher development of spiritual and moral life is conditioned by the development of the life which carries it. The footing of the natural being in the form of vitality and strength is man's hold on existence, without which he would only float in the air. Here is the earthly weight which holds him down and which he must overcome at every step upward. But here also is the source which sustains spiritual life, over against which stands death as a disvalue. It puts an end not only to the body but also to the spirit and personality. The unique grievousness of this disvalue becomes evident, from the seriousness of murder, the moral guilt against life. Injury to life and every weakness of it bear the stamp of elemental anti-value, of death, of the vital downfall. All excessive sufferings herald that disintegrating pessimism of those who are sicklied over and made unfit for life. The value of life that is sound at the core is that it approves of everything natural. This ethical attitude found its classical expression in the ancient view, that everything natural is beautiful and innocent. Where the biological soil is barren, man is doomed with all his values. Ethical anti-naturalism is an error. Asceticism is hostile to the natural and regards it as evil. Life is not created by man but is given to him or laid into his hands as it were. He can lead it to great heights and in this tendency, natural value passes over into moral value (vol 11, p. 131)

## REFLECTIONS

The recognition of the rights of elemental values in the ethical life is one of the outstanding contributions of the new ethics. Existence is the basic value. The ancient Hindus expressed a similar view in the Aphorism 'Śarīramādyam khalu dharmasāadhanam'. They regarded the body as the very vehicle of the good life and kept it in form for the higher life of the spirit. As the higher life is based on the lower, it is the moral duty of every citizen to insist upon his economic minimum. We are still glossing over this dark chapter of human life which sent its noblest sons begging at the doors of prosperous fools.

The mute millions seem to be slaving all through life, only to make a few crafty men safe on this side of existence. Half the pathology of the times is the direct outcome of economic maladjustment. Christ was the first great communist of the world, though the ethics of Christianity was a gradual turning away from the teachings of Christ to the 'Survival of the fittest' scandal of Darwin. The time has come for a corporate effort at full self-direction in human life, through a lightning revolution in the ethos of man. Economic mishaps are no longer acts of God but relics of the old barbarity which still believes in gold as the solvent of human ills. Through a thorough overhauling of the Ethico-economic groundwork of civilized human life, the technique must be sought out, to organise the means for the great ends that the moral race is destined to follow. The tragedy of the present order of civilisation is that it sinned against elemental values and missed the significance of its whole pursuit.

### (3) SUFFERING AS A VALUE

Suffering has a value. It has the effect of liberating a deeply inward and mysterious power. The incapacity to suffer, the impossibility of bearing grief and misfortune are anti-values. 'When a dire misfortune has passed away, it leaves the man, that is incapable of suffering, broken, morally warped, disfigured, weakened. he can no longer stand up, he has been damaged in his fundamental worth.' Suffering is the energy test of moral being, the load test of elasticity. 'Within the limit . . . the nearer to it so much the more—suffering means the awakening of his innermost moral nature, the unlocking of the depths of his being, the liberation of his noblest energies.' Whoever has been tested in suffering 'is tempered steel'. Moral capacity is stored up in him. He is like a 'steel spring which returns to its original strength' or to use the analogy of Nietzsche, he is 'like the strung bow which waits for the arrow'. 'Great pain opens the deep places in a way the untrained person does not dream of. And not only the depths of one's own heart but the heart of others, even the depths of the general life with its inexhaustible richness of opportunity. One's whole attitude towards life is changed.' The gaze of the unburdened man falls upon the sparkling surfaces. The man matured in suffering sees the

same situations and conflicts, the same aspirations and struggles, but he sees also below the surface. He can share the life of others and his outlook is broadened and sharpened. 'In suffering for a person there is a puzzling and unmistakable depth of participation, a communication with him, which for inward depth has no equal.' 'A mother loves her child not the less on account of the suffering which it brings her, but the more, and for nothing in the world would she allow herself to be robbed of this.' In this way, 'to suffer for his name's sake' hovered before the first Christians as the highest participation in the person of Jesus. With suffering the appreciation of happiness also deepens. 'The moral greatness of a tested character is far removed from all anxiety to flee from pain and hardship, from petty fear and worry. The quiet firm nature of the tried soul does not crave for pleasure and happiness.' And just for that reason, according to the law of happiness, it comes to him (vol. II, p. 138)

#### REFLECTIONS

That suffering is a value is not an easily acceptable proposition. Though all suffering does not come to injure, three-quarters of our intelligent effort is only directed against the invitation of the same. If suffering is a value, we must be capable of wishing it for others without moral stultification. But, can we, with a clear conscience, wish the loss of another's wife or property? If we wish for the fall of the man that caused us suffering, it is only the outcome of the agitations of the moment that cause a partial blindness. In truth, we can never wish suffering for another without an element of self-degradation. And if we cannot wish suffering for anybody, how can it be a value? The truer view would be to regard suffering as a necessary evil with which all living creation seems to be confronted. Compassion and courage are two monumental virtues that minimise the force of this evil; courage in our own adversity and compassion in those of others. A great ship asks only deep waters; a trained soul in the school of suffering is always lavish of his compassion and is no longer duped by the gay cynical world which passes over the deepest sorrows of its neighbours with an air of self-complacency. While much that Hartmann puts in on behalf of suffering

is true, the opposite also is the case with people who have gone through prolonged suffering. While some men, who have suffered, want to prevent it for others, some are interested in assiduously procuring it for those who have not yet known what it is to suffer. While suffering makes a wise man wiser, it makes the less wise a regular disciple of the devil and a colleague of the darkest gods in nature. Every cynic is a hardened romanticist and every romanticist contains the rude germs of cynicism. The chief cause of all suffering is 'attachment' and the only way out of it is 'detachment'. Ignorance is the cause of the same and knowledge is the cure of it. In the state of highest virtue there can be no shade of suffering. Epicurus held the virtuous state to be a 'tranquil, undisturbed, innocuous and non-competitive fruition, which approached most nearly the perfect happiness of the Gods, who neither suffered vexation nor caused vexation to others'. Generally, the man well poised in all the humours gets the greatest fun out of life paying the smallest bill. To seek suffering is a masochistic perversion, when it can be helped, while, to avoid it, always and at all costs, is not a sign of noble behaviour. But in no case can it be regarded as a value to be wished for. A suffering object is a sacred thing thrown as the first charge on the conscience of the moral world. The only occasion suffering is permissible is, when, by undergoing a smaller suffering, a greater suffering can be avoided. What is valuable to us is discontent and moral indignation, but not pain and suffering that make of life 'A vale of tears'. We can idealise suffering only when we have not suffered enough, for, there is nothing particularly elevating in the sum of pains that life holds in trust for most of its unlucky members, while, in the flashes of beauty it throws, there is a craving for immortality, for closing up with the beatific moment. The first and the last act of a noble mind will be to put an end to all suffering.

#### (4) HAPPINESS AS A VALUE

Happiness includes pleasure, satisfaction, joy, blessedness—and between these an extremely varied scale of spiritual states in the manner of participation in values. A man can bear only a limited measure of happiness without sinking morally. Man cannot bear both extremes. Those that are spoiled by happiness

become shallow Our nature cannot, without damage, suffer the exclusive cultivation of one value only Precisely what happiness lacks, suffering furnishes It deepens and tempers the man and sharpens his perception of values But all happiness cannot be called superficial. There is a deep and level happiness which does not exist without a tinge of suffering An exclusive ethics of duty is blind to the value of happiness (vol II, p 160)

### REFLECTIONS

Though Hartmann is no Hedonist, he recognises the value of Happiness The Hedonists are right in their fundamental philosophy of happiness What else can be the aim of life but happiness, and more of it? Hartmann is not a thorough-going Hedonist, though the trend of all ethical life is towards the supremest state of virtue If all the satisfaction that culture and courage bring can be taken away from life, all that remains is the cruel fun of knowing that we die It is a form of cultural snobbery to hold that it is not happiness that we follow directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously Historically, the Philosophy of happiness defeated itself, because, it was unlucky in the selection of its means Happiness is not a thing to be sought outside the self If a man cannot find happiness in himself, he can find it nowhere else<sup>1</sup> The difference between the Hedonist, and for example, a Vedantist (who may be regarded as professing Eudæmonism) lies in the fact that the latter looks on happiness as not external, but as rooted in and identical with the self The pursuit of happiness is nothing but self-realisation While pursuit of pleasures has no doubt to be condemned as being the pursuit of the lowly, impermanent and degrading, the pursuit of the happiness which is the self is not merely praiseworthy but the only intelligible one, since all other goals derive their worth only as fragmentation of that supreme goal The Indian Śruti declares (*taratī śokam ātmavit*) the knowledge of the true self to be the only authentic means of gaining happiness that is unalloyed There is no other conceivable way of reaching that level happiness which is not marred by secular strains New creeds open new

<sup>1</sup> *Sarvam paraivaśam duḥkham sarvamātmavaśam sukham.*

avenues of comfort and new religions new paradises, but the inside of man is full of punctures needing the knowledge of the self to make it whole. Some seek eternal truth and others eternal beauty only for the sake of the highest spiritual happiness. Mankind thinks that happiness is innocent while it is the very bloom of a beautiful soul versed in the art of the self. Without self-knowledge there is no genuine happiness and without genuine happiness our short life is a prolonged tragic joke set in the worst of tastes. The goal of life is real happiness and the ground of this is the knowledge of reality. Even a Dante, Milton or Kant could not conceive of a heaven without a balance of happiness on the side of virtue.

#### (5) JUSTICE

The primary significance of justice is in its tendency to encounter the egoism of the individual. However unlike men may be in character, disposition or social position, there exists a court of appeal before which they are equal. The tendency of justice is conservative. The communal, cultural and higher spiritual values can flourish only where life, property and personal freedom are secure. The richer and more varied patterns of moral life cannot begin until the simpler circumstances of their evolution are furnished. Justice is the moral tendency to provide these conditions, and is the minimum of morality. 'If we bear in mind that the state together with the legal institutions is a structure continually undergoing an inner revolution and never attaining finality the revision of the existing law appears as an inevitable consequence of the universal legislative trusteeship.' We have a share in the guilt of each individual. All of us are called upon to think about the transformation of things which is required by the sense of justice. 'Through solidarity man outgrows himself by devotion to his perpetual task as the architect of the community and the creator of law' (vol II, p. 228).

#### REFLECTIONS

The glaring problem of the age is the reconciliation of economic socialism with political liberty. There can be no civilisation without security, freedom, and legitimate self-expression through the individual ethos. Political liberty



dwindles into a zero if it is not backed up by economic justice. The critical hour has arrived in the history of our race, and in the solution we offer to this problem with the sense of justice at our command lies the future of humanity. Our whole fabric of the modern order is going to be smashed on the one grim paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty, if the ethical experts fail to play their part with a divine sense of justice.

#### (6) WISDOM

'This is fundamentally different from knowledge, insight, foresight, or inspection. It is the penetration of the valuational sense into life, into all discriminations, into every reaction and action, even down to the spontaneous valuational responses which accompany every experience, it is the fulfilment of one's own ethical being with its points of view, the fixed and basic attitude of the practical consciousness towards values. In a strictly anti-intellectualistic sense one might indeed call it ethical spirituality, the attitude of the ethos as the ultimate spiritual factor in humanity dominating the whole life.' 'It is a kind of ethical divination, a foreboding presentiment of the wider perspective.' Ethical divination is at bottom the living sense of life. With a thousand tentacles the wise man reaches out beyond himself and his own limited understanding. He does not live in what he already knows of himself but always 'a span beyond' (vol. II, p. 238).

#### REFLECTIONS

'Viveka', 'Antahkaranaparipakva' and 'Samyagdarśana' are the cognate values set forth by the Indian thinkers as the outfit of the moral man. Ethical divination must be carried into profounder depths by illumination born out of 'Samyagdarśana'. The finest point of ethical elevation is sensed in the maturity of the 'Antahkarana', the 'ordre du cœur' of Pascal.

#### (7) COURAGE

'Wisdom is a value which stirs man on to the choice of ends, bravery to the execution of them.' 'The most conspicuous form in which this virtue manifests itself is the outward bravery, the ability to stake one's life, the spontaneous facing of extreme danger, the standing at one's post or manliness as

the ancients called it ' 'It inheres in all decisive effort. . . . wherever there is an element of adventure in a situation which requires personal commitment and demands sacrifice ' A brave act may be worthy of a better cause Moral life is a venture and requires courage at every turn 'Along with the courageous deed must be classified the courageous word, conviction in opinion, bravery in truth, confession and thought; and not less courage to oneself and one's feeling, one's personality, the courage of great emotions, of fateful passion (the special field of false shame, fear of public opinion, a cowardly hiding of oneself) Indeed there is such a thing as the courage to live, to undergo experience, to see things through and know their quality, not less than the courage to be happy' (vol II, pp. 245, 246)

#### REFLECTIONS

Neither Aristotle nor Hartmann gives us a complete insight into courage as a value Aristotle makes courage the golden mean between rashness and cowardice But courage is neither a golden mean nor a simple quality but a mass of components held together by fulness of understanding There is no courage without knowledge and all genuine heroism is based only on this foundation To meet life on one's own terms, one needs courage All things serve a brave soul and the world is just what he makes of it The ancient civilisations fostered the ethos of bravery through a dignified literature of the actions of great men. The ancient Romans placed the statues of heroes in their houses in order to inspire their children with grand models Today, they are replaced by the photos of Greta Garbo and Maurice Chevalier A critical analysis of life on all fronts gives us the key of it in the word 'courage'. In fearlessness begins a new life The Upaniṣadic seers laid great stress on strength as the great virtue needed for the spiritual adventure. (Nāyamātmā balahīnena labhyaḥ) Success, joy, satisfaction, freedom from anxiety, exemption from meanness, and all those finer graces which glorify our little day here are the royal vestiges of courage. If courage is gone from a man's life, all the rest of it is a reaction to fears. But, even the bravest are afraid of doing that which is mean. A great portion of the courage that is needed in the world is not of a 'Rājasic'

kind. The commonplaces of everyday life need courage to be honest, courage to resist temptation, courage to speak the truth, courage to be what we really are, and not to pretend to be what we are not, and sometimes, perhaps, a courage even to pose to put down injustice. There is again strong courage needed to live honestly within our own means and not dishonestly on the proceeds of fraud protected by law. A great deal of the misery and vice of the world is due to the lack of 'Sāttvic' courage. It is worth while writing on our doors the wise and old saying 'Be bold!'—'Be bold! Be not too bold!' The highest occasions for courage arise in our minor struggles. There are great and unknown heroes and saints who carried on an inch to inch fight with the fatal invasions of want, calamity, turpitude and even physical break-down through bad nourishment, to whose memory the trumpets do not sound. Life, misfortune, isolation, abandonment, poverty, illness, disappointment, failure, and worst of all, that sinister sense of a ruined life are the gladiatorial halls where the finest men of this earth waited their hour of judgment without regrets, fears or hopes. The conversion of knowledge into power is the work of courage and the elevation of power into purity is the work of knowledge. In the ethos of the 'Sthitaprajña' enunciated by the Gītā, the morally perfect man of Spinoza and the super-man of Nietzsche, the solid ingredient is courage born out of understanding.

#### (8) SELF-CONTROL

Our instincts and impulses constitute an inner world waiting to be exploited. 'The negative side of self-control is directed exclusively against excess, lack of balance.' With the ancients, so far as they did not lose their balance through the excess of asceticism, self-control culminated in the 'inward reconciling beauty of the man whose character is completed and become steadfast'. Nothing is so radically contrary to this ideal as the stoic 'blunting and coarsening' of emotion simply for the sake of serenity and the ability to endure everything. Far more akin to it is the epicurean refinement, the enrichment, the 'rounding-out' of the emotional life leading ultimately to the enhancement of the capacity for enjoyment in the sense of ethical good taste (vol. II, pp. 249-51).

## REFLECTIONS

Hartmann should have chosen this place to estimate the ethos of asceticism and aestheticism. The significance of these two remarkable ideals cannot be passed over in a comprehensive thesis on ethics. The stoic represents the renunciant, impassive and serene attitude towards life. The aesthete represents the attitude of gratefulness to life with a cyrenaic eagerness to taste, to see, to touch and to live in high-pitched sensations. The stoic is above regret, fear and hope. The aesthete finds beauty even in the mad ravings of King Lear, in the tragic horrors of the *Oedipus Tyrannus* or the *Ghosts* of Ibsen. Stoicism is erroneously regarded as a coarse and obscene outlook on life. But, the stoicism of the imperial type, perfected by Janaka and Marcus Aurelius, was no rude and unkempt thing, but a refined and delicate discipline in the grand style of life. Aesthetic culture aims at an artistic ordering of life through a many-sided expression of the ethos. Both ideals are a lesson in the skilled cultivation of existence. In its extreme form, the ascetic ideal throbs with the spirit of inner revolt, a proud dissidence with the lies and follies of the world. Nevertheless, there is a lurid flash of beauty in the morality of renunciation, in its wanton wreckage of all the spurious values which are sacred to mediocrity. But both ideals are one-sided, the one suffers from a sui-fet of pleasure and the other from an excess of humour. The aesthete seeks sensations only to miss them the more he seeks them. The highly coloured moments of life are few. And when the great moment arrives, it falls flat on the aesthete because, he was on the tip-toe of anticipation which already exhausted his capacity to enjoy. The epicurean, bent upon 'living in the full stream of sensations', in the phrase of Walter Pater, requires a stoic probation. The mere ascetic and the mere aesthete alike lack the secret of genuine cheerfulness born out of understanding. All the same, both are equally fascinating ideals, equally fundamental reactions to an equally accommodating life. If the stoic turns away from society, it is only from the crowd of vulgar snobs who lower the valuational standards of life; if he develops the skin of a rhinoceros, it is only to screen his inner compassion for a race which has cajoled itself into an acceptance of the burden of the flesh and

foists hopes on it. The ascetic ideal lacks all-roundness, and carries its regard for one value to the extremes of forcing away the others. Though the ideal of the aesthete aims at wholeness, symmetry and harmony, it lacks the masculine grip over the treacherous emergencies of life. Here, the ethics of the golden mean breaks down. There is a crisis even in the cosmic rhythms. The superb grandeur of the death-dance of Siva over his worlds in ruin symbolises the ethos of perfect strength. Real moral beauty is attained when the ethos is alive to the fulness of life with a splendid strength of detachment. A stoic dignity of spirit and an epicurean refinement of taste are called for, to express thankfulness to life. The pattern ethos is a harmony of moods, a balance of humours, with a spice of elemental strength, leading to the gracefulness of personal poise, a masterpiece of invulnerability, in peace, power and beauty. The Greek ideal of beauty and the Hindu ideal of detachment blend into a sterling formula of the higher ethos, giving its owner the proud secret of the dignified handling of life.

#### (9) PURITY

As a value purity is more akin to goodness. He is pure whom no desire leads astray and no temptation allures. His ethos consists of an inner tendency turned away from disvalues. The man of experience has passed through conflicts and his eyes have been opened at the price of innocence. Ignorance, simplicity and childishness are all worthy in the eyes of purity. They constitute 'Sancta Simplicitas'. The morally complex character is uncertain and does not easily walk on the straight path. 'The simplicity, straightforwardness, guilelessness of the pure possesses for the man standing in the midst of his diversified experiences and burdened by them, something convincing and redemptive'. 'Purity of heart is the primal Christian value. Blessedness is the ethos of the child. Aristotle denied to the child all capacity for happiness though in happiness he saw all moral fulfilment. But like goodness and nobleness, purity also is the basis of a series of well-known values. Sincerity, frankness, openness lie in the same direction. The pure have nothing to conceal as the shame of guilt is lacking in them. They hate the mask and their nudity is not nakedness. The pure lack the worldly wisdom for subterfuge. To the man of the

world, he is, in his ultimate nature, incomprehensible. The worldly man is incapable of being straightforward and clear-sighted. The pure can understand the pure. The pure mind has the influence for good. In his obliviousness to evil, he becomes a symbol and attracts the fallen and the morally prostrate. In his presence the worldly wise man finds a charm which is the education of the grown-ups through the child. Perfect purity edges on holiness. Purity is irrecoverable when it is lost, and is antinomic to maturity (vol II, pp 211-21).

### REFLECTIONS

Purity and maturity are not insoluble antinomies as understood by Hartmann. These are simply two different values that can co-exist in the same person without contradiction. Purity if it is the virtue only of a child, is anterior to all ethical circumstance. Then, how can it be a virtue? As the German dramatist Schiller expresses it 'Happy child! the cradle is still to thee a vast space; but when thou art a man, the boundless world will be too small for thee'. Here, 'the boundless world is too small for thee', because, you are reacting to an infinity waiting to engulf you. He who does not dare and dream cannot fare well in the moral adventure. It is, after all, circumstances that reveal men in their true colours. Life is full of insidious plots for the overthrow of the soul. Wisdom consists in keeping a stiff rein and moving gently on. The greatest art is the art of moderating haste. It is always best to be at a safe distance from vice and sin and avoid the need for recovery. But, because a man has seen 'a bit of life', he need not be refused admission into heaven. The craving for a return to a child-like innocence and simplicity is never found in the line of higher thinking. Why should we fall back on the ethos of the child which we have discarded when we passed into higher thinking? Why should we fall back on the ethos of mere mortals when we have passed into the ethos of the superman? There is no limit to this range of transcendence, except the limits put by fear and despair. The value of purity, as a moral virtue, consists in its being proof against corruption. The ethos of the 'Karma Yogi' set forth in the Gītā is one of the finest ideals that combines purity and maturity into a higher synthesis. One can be 'in it' and yet 'out of it'. Stand-

ing still in the midst of motion and keeping pure in the midst of all the temptations of the under-world is a feat of ethical strength. But, without this trial, a supposed pure man does not possess the valid pass-port. It is a mistake to suppose that all change is corruption. Man is not born white to be coloured black by life. Change is the nature of the non-self. The spirit is unchanging. In the midst of a full and many-sided life, without being a child or a recluse, one can remain chemically pure, by keeping a psychic distance from all that is objective. The celebrated poet Kalidasa gives us the most beautiful concept of detachment in his description of Īśvara, the Lord of the worlds united with his consort, supporting with his eight forms the entire universe, yet, himself remaining free from the tumults of the ego. The man of great insight, even in his most enthusiastic participations in the ways of this little world, is still, essentially, a spectator. How can a looker-on be polluted by a strange performance going on without an end or beginning. To be pure is to be detached in the midst of the flow.

#### (10) NOBILITY

A mind is noble which is directed to the high, the ideal, and is detached from everything trivial and secondary. By its very nature, the noble is not the concern of everybody. It is exclusive and chooses special values. In this sense, it is 'aristocratic', in contrast, both to the mass of people and the multitude of values. It sets itself against the tendency to flock like sheep, and against all mass-production. Differences of level in the individual ethos are essential to nobility. From amongst good people, it picks out those who from its point of view are best. The noble thus restores the discrimination which the good discards. It is not interested in rulership but only in selection and moral being itself. The tendency of the noble is first to create the axiologically superior type, the ideal of man. In nobility, man possesses the power to determine himself according to foresight. It is a clairvoyant discernment, a conscious emotional rapport with the transcendent powers of the genuine self-subsisting ideal. The moral ascent of man never proceeds historically from the multitude but always through a select group of pioneers. This pioneering is the path-finding

role of the noble in the life and creation of the commonwealth. Once it is strengthened and matured, it moves the heaviest mass 'Herein lies the law of nobility and at the same time its right to segregation and selection' In the history of the ethos, nobility takes the shape of a revolutionary tendency born out of the fulness and progressive readiness for change in the outlook of values The noble is always seeking, grasping and laying hold upon the untried, the uncommon and the adventurous The noble man is averse to compromise and his salvation lies in the exclusive fostering of special values To the noble, all half-measures are despicable Native to nobility is a wide outlook, the grand style in the inner life and work, even under outwardly narrow circumstances He responds to everything great and for its own sake, without a thought of reward The noble man is the sworn foe of all pettiness and vulgarity He lives above the commonplace and ethically insignificant He does not strike back where he cannot respect his opponent His bearing and intensified sensitiveness proceed from an inner immunity from all that is mean 'The free unburdened devotion to what is great accords with a capacity for genuine enthusiasm, for real absorption in an enterprise, not only an ability to make sacrifices but even a delight in doing so The joy of devotion is the knightly virtue of the morally strong And on that again rests the strong man's power over others, the ability to carry them with him, to make them capable of nobility It is the power of his ethos itself, the kindling example of the pioneer'

The magnanimity of the noble penetrates everything, even the most trifling It selects both ends and means alike 'The noble man spurns low means which do not seem to him justified by the end, but which drag it down and dishonour it' His only drawback is his defencelessness against baser forces which shrink from nothing Against the peculiar strength of the common, he has no armour He can battle only with his peers and contend only in great things and not in small He succumbs where the base fall on him by stealth and has more in common with a noble enemy than a mean ally 'Where this ethos arrives at self-consciousness, it become noble pride. The noble man must rely on himself His conception of honour is severe, elevated and wholly inconceivable by commonplace



men. Yet he is not absorbed in self-respect and self-esteem, his attention is not turned upon himself ' With him, 'good taste' in intercourse is no 'conventional form', but his own sensitiveness for the nobleness in every one. He keeps his distance, is not pushing, but modest in pride. Obtrusiveness and boastfulness seem to him equally absurd. Even in sympathy and love, he is sensitive in approach from regard for others' individuality. His respect for others is thus a pure, happy and even joyful recognition. He is capable of unenvious reverence for the morally superior and of admiration without jealousy. 'He admires only what is above him. From what is below him he looks away—not intentionally nor out of disdain, but because his purview is occupied with other things. The noble man lives in what he can admire. If he wishes to drag it down and tread upon it as the envious do, he would need it to drag himself down' (vol 1, pp 192-203)

#### REFLECTIONS

The noble man is nature's royal breed, and God's sublime work in the midst of much that is ridiculous. Aristotle's high-minded man and Nietzsche's super-man are parallels to this standard. There are other elements in this ethos which can be set forth here. He who is nobler than his calling and superior to his fate is a puny God whom life cannot blacken. The essence of nobility is the pursuit of the ideal, in total disregard of its conditioning factors. This fearless man is high-toned and lofty in vision with a contempt for the costs of its achievement. The ethos of nobility is the birth-right of the aristocratic race of nature's great Lords, a fine sample of the morality of the masters. The noble race is the elite which lives in close intimacy with the gods of Olympus. It is not given to all to bend the bow of Ulysses and nobility is an ethos that the gods give without man's asking. The noble man can only have a large compassion towards the human race but its companionship is exceptional. The ancient 'Rājārṣis' of India and the 'Philosopher Kings' of Plato are the high-priests of the ethos of nobility to follow whom is the everlasting privilege of the average whose values do not go beyond economic goods and secular guarantees.

## (11) PLATONIC EROS (LOVE)

Dreary idealism and dull absorption in the present are alike worthless from the ethical point of view. In both, earnestness and completeness of effort are lacking. To combine a life viewed in the light of ideals with a cool eye for the actual and the possible requires an ethos much above the average. A noble synthesis of this type gives to the bearer a dignity which grows with the greatness of the ends he pursues. In such a life the real destiny of man is fulfilled in the participation of the creation of the world. Plato has done the abiding service of seeing in the 'Eros' the unique value of that kind of striving which leaves behind it not only all personal ends but even those of one's own social environment and of one's own contemporaries. Animal nature survives in what it produces. Its care for its young, its capacity to die for them, the concern about the future life of the species is symbolical of the immortality in the mortal. Man has his spiritual procreation whereby he passes the imperishable by participation in virtue. The Platonic love is the deeper absorption in the Idea, great passion for it and personal commitment to it which transforms man altogether. There is an ethos which encompasses this transcendence with the emotional strength of the Platonic 'Eros'. It is an ethos of love but love for the man who is to be and he is conceivable in idea. It is a love which knows no return, which radiates and gives only. Thus, the love of the remote is a caressing of the future, disdain and indifference to which is a sin. In all this, the moving principle is the ethical ideal, the ideal of the man as he ought to be. 'And because it reaches beyond the limits of an individual life, it naturally reduces the individual to a link in a chain of life, which connects the past with the future. Man sees himself caught into a larger providence which looks beyond him and yet is his own.' The formation of the ideal is a passing beyond recognised values, a regular revolution in ethical consciousness. It avenges itself on the daring doer, the prophet or the thinker by the wrath of a whole nation. The prophets destroy the solidarity of their own times (vol. II, p. 314).

## REFLECTIONS

The Platonic 'Eros' is the ethos of the race of intellectuals since Plato. It is an elevated expression of the poetical feeling

embedded in the human pathos of imagination, the daring expression of the lyric quality of our highest aspirations. Its devotion to the lofty ideal is nothing but the inarticulate search for the highest truth. In this virtue, man is no longer a thing of clay, but is 'caught up in a larger providence' and is transmuted and divinised by the force of the ideal he holds. When the actual is discrepant with the ideal, it evokes the moral protest of the prophet and the path-finder. Human history is built on the blood of martyrs who died in the cause of truth tried by untruth. The work of a Christ was finished on the Cross and the work of a Gandhi is done only from within the prison-bars. What does it indicate but the fact that truth demands a sacrifice? And for what is the sacrifice done? It is not for the actual which may or may not continue to be in conflict with the ideal, but the ideal itself which expresses the highest poetry of the human ethos. This love of the ideal will some day lead to the intellectual love of God, if we should love at all.

#### (12) PERSONAL LOVE

'Every one who does not lead a shadow-like existence amidst generalities and principles is well aware that besides universal love of one's neighbour and of the far distant, and besides the love which dispenses spiritual gifts, there is another, closer and richer, an intimate love directed exclusively to one individual person' (vol. II, p. 368). The other types, being impersonal, do not participate in the innermost nature of any one, nor seek after it in its entirety and fulness. Personal love aims at personality as such, and for its own sake. It is a human intimacy far greater than that between neighbours. Indeed, all love aims at values, all 'Eros', in one way or other, looks to the ideal. Whatever in itself is of worth finds its fulfilment only by becoming a value for 'someone'. Personality needs this; otherwise, its blossoming is overlooked. 'Only another personality can satisfy this yearning and be the counter pole in the fulfilment of its meaning. And the mystery of love is that it satisfies this deepest and least understood craving' (vol. II, p. 369). One who loves gives this unique gift to the person he loves. He gives a new dimension to the being of the loved one, enabling him to be for himself what otherwise is not possible. Personal love is the value complementary to

personality, a communication to it of its own meaning. It provides what a personality cannot acquire for itself in the shape of a mirror which reflects the same. Love looks exclusively to the ideal value that is embodied in the empirical person. 'It lives in him what inheres in his essential tendency the axiological idiosyncrasy of his ideal, yet, not as an ideal but as a trend towards actuality, just as if it were already actualised in him' (vol. II, p. 369). Personal love lives by faith in this highest within the loved one. Love senses the ideal in the apparent inefficiency and imperfection of the empirical person prophetically. Such love is the ethical divination of the ideal of a particular individual. 'It sees the perfect in the imperfect, infinitude in the finite' (vol. II, p. 370). It widens the sphere of personality raising it to a higher power by including within its compass and counting as its own, the personal being of the loved one. The relationship consists not simply in the union of the two empirical personalities, but also in the higher union of the two kinds of ideal ethos. 'And this is the distinctive power of all love which enters deeply in one's personal life, it brings to light the otherwise hidden and neglected essence of one's individuality' (vol. II, p. 371). Love no more allows itself to be forced than willed. In all personal love there is a desire to place oneself at the service of the beloved, with kindness and devotion. It is a tendency quite opposed to the possessive attitude. Even in renunciation, this can continue undiminished. Genuine deeply felt love has the power to transform one's morality. In love the highest sense of participation in the eternal is experienced with an elevation beyond pleasure and pain. 'That precisely this feeling can on the one hand become a passion (and by no means merely on a sex basis) and on the other can flood a whole human life with vast serenity, is due to the fact that deep below the threshold of consciousness it touches like a soft light the primal source of spiritual life' (vol. II, p. 377). Personal love unites innermost depths to innermost depths overleaping the surfaces. The language of the lovers is not tied to words alone. They reveal in a thousand symbols and revelations. 'Body and soul must serve it with all their capacities. It makes for itself organs of insight, its resources are inexhaustible.' From it issues an understanding of which a man who does not love knows nothing.

a life of inward and profound communion. Sometimes, one's love may outgrow his strength. 'In that case from the unlocking of his nature ensues a painful uprooting, a desolation. Even love as a value manifests here something like a danger-point' (vol. II, p. 378). The lover looks only to the ideal. 'The whole art of love consists in retaining the highest point of vision as perspective and remaining under its spell. A life of love is a life spent in the knowledge of what is best worth knowing, a life of participation in the highest that is in man' (vol. II, p. 381). Personal love like radiant virtue gives an ultimate meaning to life. It is useless like every genuine self-subsistent value, 'but a splendour shed upon our path' (vol. II, chap. XXXII, pp. 368-81).

#### REFLECTIONS

If we hold the whole domain of values in the philosopher's scales, the balance may lean towards personal love as the acme of valuational fulfilment. If we divine life in all its phases, we feel the subtlest point when we touch the portion of personal love. It is at once the tragedy and triumph of our earthly existence. A life that is ennobled by its spell burns with ecstasy even in its most trying circumstances. A loving child rebelling against the cast-iron conventions of an unfeeling society is the favourite theme of artists from the Greeks to Galsworthy. Love holds death at bay, rounds our concrete sense of beauty into a personal experience in the most recondite parts of consciousness. Most people are vain because they do not believe in the reality of personal love. All of us are in need of somebody to bear with us, to put up with our weakness and celebrate the little triumphs of our life together. The institution of marriage is an expression of this primal need of the human heart. Ultimately the concept of personal love ennobles us to that degree of perfection as to make us long for 'the eternal companion'.

#### (13) PERSONALITY

Every man is by nature a personality having a certain human attribute which does not reappear outside himself. It is distinct from individuality and only an individual person is a personality. The fact of personality is distinct from its

valuational character, though they are never separate. Like all values this is an independent ideal self-existence. But, as value, it cannot coincide with the actual personality. The value of it is something over and above the empirical being. Personality, not being a universal, differs radically from all others. As such, it cannot be decisively fixed for all persons and its claim as an 'ought' is applicable only to one special person. Only one person ought to be so. 'For this reason one may describe personalities as individual values; each individual has his own for itself' (vol II, p. 243). This does not mean that the specific complex is actualised in the real personality. It only expresses the axiological ideal and is its ideal ethos. The empirical man falls short of his ideal to the extent to which he falls short of the claim of the general values which the ought makes. In this regard personality is also like other universal values. It has a strictly ideal self-existence quite independent of the question of its actualisation. It is a norm like other values. But it must be noted, it is not a universal one. One may fail to achieve this value also. Where a man lapses into the imitation of another's personal ethos, there is a failure of his own. By a surrender to the host of lower powers that hold us, we may miss the same. By a tyrannical domination of one universal value, the repression of personality may occur. 'The moral value of a personality could then be described unequivocally as the fulfilment of the intelligible character, (the Kantian phrase) in the empirical person' (vol II, p. 344). A man bears guilt for the failure of his own moral being, and the fulfilment of it is, in the true sense of the word, his virtue. Personality being a highly complex value, its constituent elements are universal values. 'According to their genus personalities are not in absolute opposition to universal values. They are the extreme case of the concretion and individualisation of valuational matter. But, not only is personality different in every single individual, but, it also "ought" to be different, to make precisely through this difference the morally evolved man unique and irreplaceable. In him the individual ethos entrenches itself upon the universal ethos.' 'The moral, ought to be in man is not spent in that of the general moral values. It is not fulfilled until it reaches a culminating point, the special moral value of 'This' particular person. Thus arises

an opposition of values, indeed, an antinomy between personal value that is universal and value of personality (vol 11, p 349) The majority of men have but 'little personality' What we call 'a great personality' is by no means always a highly individualised ethos The historically productive, efficient stimulating man, the hero, the intercessor, the pioneer in a common cause is only a powerful representative of a general ethos It is not in this sense that personality is used here It is used in the sense of individuation of the ethos itself and of its impress on the actual man Historical greatness is by no means involved in it 'The brave man, the wise, the just, the loving, the faithful or the truthful, can also possess moral greatness' (vol 11, p 353) In a strict sense personality applies solely to the uniqueness and differentiation of that valuational complex which constitutes, in a man's ethos, the preferential trend of his inner disposition Only through such a trend or unique assimilation of such trends into a unity of an ethos does one rise above the average 'Personality, in the strict sense, is not to be found among famous persons—the moral significance of the hero is precisely his super-individual quality, but away from the noisy streets of great ends and services' 'The greatness of personality is much more a purely inner greatness, it has scope in the most narrow spheres of life, for it is nothing else than uniqueness of commitment for values and, indirectly uniqueness of the valuational perspectives with which a man permeates his sphere in life' (vol 11, p 354) A marked personality carries his standards in himself and is loyal only to himself in following them. 'He sees the world in a light of his own, as no one else sees it, in the light of his preferred values . and lives in accord with them He is a world for himself, in the true sense of the word' (vol 11, p 354) 'This is the reason that genuine personality, possesses such attraction for others. Participation in it is a second life in a second world Who sees the personal element in a man and lovingly comprehends it—and only to the appreciative glance is it visible—lives amidst abounding values of another order from those of one who is blind to personality. His world is infinitely richer, fuller and higher, diversified in values and vast' (vol 11, p. 354). A personality which does not fulfil the commandments of justice, truthfulness, fidelity and brotherly-love, carries an

inner displacement. A spurious personality is a chaotic and false morality without any ethical foundation. A vain cloak of personality is a downright moral swindle. Universal values constitute the basis of all morality claiming unconditional precedence. Only on their material basis can the more highly differentiated form of personal values rest. Any imitation of another's personality is ridiculous. In this we have a proof of the individual 'ought to be' and of the genuineness of personality as a moral value. In ethical life, following an example is something altogether different from copying an individual. There can be discipline in brotherly-love, justice, truthfulness and the like, but not in personality. Such imitation is essentially limited to general values and if applied to personality it becomes mere copying and brings about a counterfeit of the same. An imitator is a positive destroyer and falsifier of his own true personal essence. A deliberate effort at the construction of personality results in a pose covering an ethos stunted through adulteration. 'A genuine personality is cast in one mould, is solid, a moral entity which, as it were, has grown naturally. It can never be found where there has been deliberate effort to become a personality. It is not a thing willed over against the will; it is autonomous, it has its law in itself and follows its law without deliberating' (vol. II, p. 364, chap. xxxii, pp. 344-67).

#### REFLECTIONS

Personality is the foe of mediocrity and axiological commonplaceness. It is the specific amalgam of values that constitute the stuff of this virtue. The seer, the poet, the philosopher and the artist are the men who really possess personality. They aim at unique individual self-expression by valuational divination. The Great Alexanders and Napoleons of History are only the champions of the crowd. Even in ordinary life, we come across here and there rare examples of personalities that have scaled the heights and look at the pageant of humanity from the peak. Why most people are dull and boring is, they lack this unique blend of values; and what they so lack, they fill up with power and foolishness. Personality of the highest type seeks isolation from the crowd and craves for the fellowship of similar minds; and its tragedy is the tragedy of the heights.



primordial aloofness of the man of vision, intensely seeking company of God, because, the company of men has left with a large pity for their all-too-human woes by wickedness taste for blood.

### CRITICAL NOTES

1. Hartmann has arbitrarily restricted the range and extent of his analysis of values. There are whole spheres of values which are not brought into the picture. But, as his view of values raises, by implication, the relation of moral values to the aesthetic and the religious, this keeping down of the disclosure, at an interesting stage renders his results incomplete. He leaves us, after dealing with situational and goods-values, and their relation to moral values and their inner gradations, to a sphere of cognate material. He should have given us an idea of their connections with these adjacent domains, because, the whole kingdom of values, on Hartmann's view is a well-ordered, isolated objective moral cosmos. Then, again, we are left in the dark as to the real status of moral values. 'Are they genuine values?' is the question. He has not answered it.

2. Hartmann has left out a consideration of the bearings of aesthetic culture on ethics. Is a real and permanent ethics possible without a concrete sense of beauty? Aesthetic experience is itself an expression of the subtler sense of value. What is the quality of the ethos of the Artist who looks at a city flames and gets the feeling of the lines 'One moment in civilisation's waste'? The study of aesthetics is the best avenue of approach to the ethics of values. A course of training in the philosophy of beauty gives the insight necessary for appreciating the contents of ethics with a higher vision.

3. To the list of virtues sampled in the work, a set of passive virtues should have been added to give a more comprehensive idea of the field. 'Compassion', 'resignation', 'fortitude', 'cheerfulness', 'disinterestedness', 'non-violence', 'Satyā-śha', are a few of the passive virtues in which the ethos of the East expresses itself. In the fully-shaped ethos, activist and passivist virtues find a noble balance. Generally speaking, the West has specialised in aggressive, militaristic and worldly-wise virtues, while the East developed the peaceful, meditative and contemplative values. The ethos of the West

is 'Rājasic' and that of the East is 'Sāttvic' Even the momentous political struggle for freedom in India under the guidance of Gandhiji has taken on the grandeur of an ethical movement towards the purification of the contemporary ethos Today, even in the West, the pride of power, and achievement are giving way to a new despair Christendom lived for two thousand years with full faith in the reality of social and political life The result was the great war and a preparation for another There is a poignant historical irony in the phenomenon, that in a civilization which made 'neighbour-love' its major premise, all the inhuman Wars known to man have originated The triumph of Christianity over the pagan world has only brought into play the ruder and more violent sections of life to oust the subtler, the more intellectual and graceful cultures of humanity. The 'White man's burden' is the biggest hoax ever invented to exploit the physically peaceful races of the earth under a cloak of decency The spirit of the East is awakened and its final emancipation lies in living like its great ancients under the banner of contemplative virtues The nemesis of the machine-civilization is creeping apace The West has played a game with social life and dealt with human nature in the drawing-room of masked men and women It has passed over the violent crashes, the deep wounds that beset its inner world Western science and brute power have gone in deliberate search for the Faustian infinite The command which science has given is only used for domination and destruction of the value of life The spread and development of knowledge for which many devout spirits paid their lives, is slowly passing away into a dreadful disillusionment The times are literally out of joint What can the East say to the crisis brooding over our destiny? Can we get out of a sort of 'beyond recovery' feeling? The ailment must be met by a return to the nobler life of contemplation The sages of the Upaniṣads, the Buddha and Confucius were all champions of the meditative mode of life Modern science is no foe to it; but the ethos that guides it needs a new turning point. With every advance of secular knowledge, we have only come to feel the void places in materialism The sense of values is the hallmark of any civilisation. Judged by a scale of values, the present order has an increasingly disastrous trend towards the

derogation of man into the level of a means. The task of the new savants is to recreate the ethos of the future and make the world safe for human beings. Love of beauty, love of truth, liberal culture, freedom, justice, are all the title-deeds of a superior civilization. Economic security, political freedom, and leisure are the three conditions that hold the seeds of true civilization. Without them, civilization is the triumph of the beast over beauty. Dogmatism, excessive espionage, aggressive nationalism and the gospel of money-making are its enemies. Passive virtues are the stable foundations for any enduring order of higher life. The finer values of truth, beauty, goodness, knowledge, reasonableness, love, and all those major and minor graces of life can flourish only on a soil of security and freedom. Hartmann has made this point remarkably clear. The erudite must evolve the technique of the new ethos that is to transmute the machine-man of to-day into the God of to-morrow. In the highest form of civilization, the contemplative life carries off the laurels and the active life feels thankful to take the second place. The 'Jivanmukta' and 'Bodhisattva' ideals of the East give us a glimpse into the heights of the civilized life. We hear of the ancients doing 'Tapas' for the sake of the beautiful life. The ethos of the contemplative life has a meditative beauty filling its gliding movements with the sense of peace and fulfilment. Civilization is not possible without some form of economic and political security. Under the modern conditions, a form of economic socialism is a condition precedent for the possibility of the good life. That being inevitable, the next step is to make it thoroughly consistent with liberty. Athens under Pericles and India under kings like Asoka or Bhoja are examples of highly civilized countries. But they are lucky accidents of a process which has degenerated rapidly without a plan. To-day, the world is a paradise for the few and a purgatory to the many without a sense of justice at the heart of economic, social, and political life. The modern man is a broken reed unable to adjust his secondary needs. We have lost our bearings and are drifting into a second crop of barbarity. To dignify human relationships and transmute them under the spell of a higher vision is the task of the new savants. The ideal world, the kingdom of God, must be established here and now, by the revolution of the inner man. Perhaps, even in an ideal

society based on the new ethos there is bound to be inequality, but we are sure, it can neither be oppressive nor appalling. The only type of inequality that would still continue to exist in the humanistic Utopia would be the one between a man like Gandhi or Tagore and an under-graduate who prefers Shaw to Shakespeare. Superiority disarms envy and admiration creates love. The wisdom of the East and the science of the West are close by our side in this hour of crisis. To build the kingdom of God on earth by their aid, through a lightning revolution in the ethos of man is the next great adventure of the human race; a disillusioned world in search of its soul. Through the conversion of the contemporary ethos on a grand scale, a new generation of nobler beings may arise, who will deliver the 'Coup de grace' to all the scandals of its preceding eras. With a higher vision of values, we have to arrange our breast-work for a more human civilization. And, in any historic effort in the line of the good life, the decisive role will be played by the virtues that the sages of India taught long before the advent of the Buddha or the Christ. It is a pity that Hartmann has completely omitted a discussion of the contemplative and practical modes of life. What Hartmann has done for the Christian and the Greek ethics, somebody must do for the Ethics of the East, with its great emphasis on the meditative life. The key to the whole of Eastern ethics may be summed up in its great maxims 'Production without Possession' and 'Development without Domination'. Can we seize hold of this secret and steer the course of civilization through its epochal danger-zones?

## PART VI

### FREEDOM OF THE WILL

The question of freedom extends along the frontier line of ethical investigation. The final third of Hartmann's work is devoted to the subject which he regards as foundational to ethics. We have already noticed that he denies Providence and universal teleology to safeguard the rights of man. Cosmic teleology and human teleology are contradictory and mutually exclusive. The craving for salvation through grace is ethically degrading as it involves the surrender of man's freedom. He who has power must bear the burden, because, only the morally

free are capable of right and wrong. A divine teleology dominating the world for its own inscrutable ends rules out the moral distinctiveness of man and makes him a simple natural entity. Apart from freedom, values lose their specific moral significance and coincide with goods values. They fail to evoke moral approval and disapproval. That is why Hartmann took great pains to show that values require an ought that does not realise itself, and an agent who helps or hinders its realisation. Man is the only mediator between values and reality. But he is under no obligation to realise them. If it so pleases him, he can as well choose to give up his moral task and remain neutral. In other words, he is a moral agent, only because he is an imperfect mediator. Were he to be a perfect mediator, he would only be a moral automaton guaranteed to do no wrong. Perfection as a mediator entails the loss of his moral office by virtue of which alone he can do good or evil.

These considerations lead Hartmann to a re-study of the free-will problem. Many of the ancient systems assumed freedom, or, if they attempted to analyse it, falsified it. It was Kant, who in his statement of the third antinomy, first set forth the whole problem in clear outlines. On the one hand, he extricated freedom from the ambiguities of pantheism or any other divine teleology, and on the other, he made it quite consistent with the causal determination of nature. Freedom, as he maintained, involves simply the addition of a new determinant not contained in the original chain of events. Both teleology and mechanism imply a monism of determination and shut the doors against freedom. He demonstrated a dualism of determination through the double stratification of the world, in which a teleological determinant is added to the uniform mechanism of nature. This is possible, as he argued, because, the totality of effects produced by a system of causal threads is never a closed one, as is that of a teleological system with all the ends fore-ordained. It is always open and admits the addition of a new determinant without causing a break or suspension in the causal course (vol. III, ch. IV, pp. 53-9). This addition only diverts the causal nexus for some willed ends without creating a breach. Kant was right so far, but was wrong in interpreting this positive freedom as determination by 'reason'. Man is free in the sense of being his own

law-giver. This would mean that his freedom is only 'freedom under law', for, in disobedience to the moral imperative man is then always unfree. Again, Kant located the source of this rational freedom in a transcendental self that is super-individual. All the acts of the empirical self which alone are individual are heteronomous. Then, he failed to distinguish between reason as law-giver and reason as deciding for or against the law. That which issues and accepts the command being identical, man has no real autonomy. Hartmann seeks to set right these defects by his conception of value and personality.

Value is something more than reason and can by no means be identified with it. It is a wholly independent determinant which man as a rational or emotional being may accept or reject. This is not to say that freedom is simply the negative freedom of indeterminism. A man can be free neither from his inner nor from his outer circumstances. But because he is so, it does not follow, that he must be so, or he must be a faithful slave. The balance may be altered by throwing other determinants into the scales. Fortunately for Hartmann, he could find no evidence of an all-inclusive oneness of cosmic determinism. He insists only on two conditions: (1) the order of nature and (2) the order of values. Freedom is possible for a free being only when there is a conflict between them. Kant no doubt solved the causal antinomy and made man free, but, he got involved in a second antinomy, which Hartmann calls 'ought antinomy' (pp. 130-213). Though Kant admitted that the law does not compel but merely commands, he saw autonomy only in obedience to it. A will that acted in direct conflict with the law was constrained by natural forces (vol. III, ch. VIII, pp. 102, 110). To prove this autonomy, Hartmann introduces a third determinant. The ought, whether a law of reason or an independent principle of value, is in itself powerless. It can only incline the balance but cannot determine it unless an actual 'volitional constituent' is added. But this fact, namely that the ought can operate only through the third, need not mean that it should inevitably embody the second. A will contrary to value is not, as such, determined by the ought, because it can add its own plus of determination. It is no use objecting that the will that chooses the lower value is always, as Kant said, 'determined by nature', because, a typical moral antinomy dis-

proves this. A typical moral antinomy is a case in which values of equal claim compete. In merging the autonomy of the person in that of the principle, Kant simply overlooked this possibility. In such a case, man needs a plus of determination not only over the determination of nature but also over against the claim of the ought. When faced with a crisis of the kind, he cannot wait and watch. He can only take a decision between antithetical values by the addition of an autonomous determinant distinct both from natural and moral laws. In this way, on Hartmann's view, the very irreconcilability of values that is the despair of the student of ethics, affords a possible solution of the metaphysical problem of freedom (vol. III, p. 137). Then, Hartmann has not overthrown the causal theory but only drawn it into his service by positing over against the phenomenal world of nature a higher principle of personality. The higher entity is the person who adds his determination to the causal course of nature and the moral order of values. A purposeful being can never exist in an utterly indeterministic and lawless world in which all is chance and change. Causal connections may be put to use for desired ends only because the addition of a free factor does not cut off its sequence. Kant's ethical freedom was ultimately the freedom of the impersonal practical reason as such. It is only the autonomy of an abstract ethical principle over against the non-ethical laws of nature. But Hartmann's person is not only free as against the causal law, but even as against the moral law itself. It is not the fact of determination that is challenged but a monism of determination. On Hartmann's view there are three kinds of determinations.

- (1) Causal determination, conditioned by fact
- (2) Final determination guided by value
- (3) Personal determination conditioned by fact and guided by value.

Kant freed the will from the causal determination and handed it over to the tyranny of the second. Hartmann, by his conception of value and personality, simply supplied a third determinant, to free man from the Kantian antinomy. Personal determination is conditioned by fact, guided by values and is finally expressed in a free act of choice with the seal of personal commitment.

Of course, Hartmann does not say that this affords a complete demonstration of freedom. Indeed he admits that such a demonstration is impossible. Freedom is not a datum and is only a meta-physical object reached by inferences from data. Of such objects complete proof is lacking. We can attain such a proof only if we can show that it is ontologically necessary. But what we can actually show is that it is 'axiologically necessary' and 'ontologically possible'. The whole substance of the first two books is sufficient argument for its axiological necessity. We witness its axiological necessity in the many outstanding ethical facts which cannot be explained away as an illusion. Of course, 'consciousness of freedom' need not by itself mean 'freedom of consciousness'. Consciousness of freedom may be a deception, but, in that case, the burden falls on the ethical sceptic to show the possibility of the existence of that deception. On this view, ethics would become a part of the problem of error. The fact is, such beliefs involve more assumptions than the natural belief that consciousness of freedom involves to some degree freedom of consciousness (vol II, ch XIV, p 172).

To these arguments is annexed a metaphysical demonstration of the ontological possibility of freedom, although it is by no means necessary. A subject can exist which obeys the causal determination of fact on the one side and the final determination of value on the other, and is yet capable of choosing his own goals and creating his own ethical destiny. This demonstration is made by a reference to his categorical laws of dependence. The dualism of determination through the causal sequence and the final nexus resulting from human volition is not complete. As its metaphysical basis, behind it, opens out the whole perspective of categories. It is a plurality but nevertheless presents a unitary structure. The causal and the axiological structures appear more opposed than they actually are, because, there are several intervening strata of whose determinational types we have no knowledge. But their presence is undoubted. There are also a number of strata below the causal and above the finalistic, though our knowledge of them is inadequate. Below the causal we recognise the mathematical type of determination penetrating all relations of quantity and the still more general logical determination of the relations of being as such. Above the causal sequence of the physical world, lie the strata



of organic life and of consciousness. Obviously, we do not know the nature of their determinations nor the mode of their transition from one to the other. It is quite evident that they form the basis of the higher stratum of human personality, which is the domain of freedom. The categorical laws of stratification apply to all these strata. The higher category or stratum in each case is the weaker and is dependent on the lower which constitutes its nature, but it has its own special types of organisation set round its own laws. The biological laws that govern organic life are different from those of physics, as also from the psychological laws of consciousness. Each higher stratum presents something novel and qualitatively superior. Though it is weaker than the lower, it is free as against it. In this way, the specific type of determination characteristic of the human stratum also can be explained. As the law of the higher stratum, it launches something new. Though the human stratum cannot be defined, it forms no exception to the general principles of categorical relations. The structure of autonomy is fundamentally the same at every stage. Hence the analogy is decisive for the freedom of the will also (vol III, pp. 240-6). It must be noted that the analogy is meant only for the possibility of free-will. Its necessity cannot be proved since the complete set of its conditions cannot be assigned. For actuality, one has only to turn to ethical phenomena. This, of course does not prove absolute freedom even as a possibility. In the end he admits that no will is more than partially free (vol III, p. 252).

### CRITICISM

1. The whole question of freedom can be wiped off the boards without prejudice to ethics. It has no more bearing on it than it has on physics or poetry. The poet is psychologically determined when he wrote his *Ode to a Grecian Urn*. But does this invalidate the piece as such, because, it is only the outcome of certain molecular vibrations? The beauty, the grace and charm of the creation, or the credit of the poet is in no way affected by the fact that he could not have created it otherwise. When one is proficient in philosophy and another in mathematics, who are you to appropriate the credit? Something is expressing itself in and through you by the spontaneous necessity of its

own nature which you and I are claiming as our own. We realise that we have chosen neither the moment of arrival nor of departure from here, and what remains, in betw life and death, is a short span conditioned by the sum-total the whole cosmic history up-to-date, the substance of the f will problem is gone, leaving aside a residue of inconsequer From a logical point of view, the victory is always with determinist, though it falls short of moral conviction wh assumes freedom without ever being able to prove it To qu Spinoza, 'In the mind there is no absolute or free will, the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause wh has also been determined by another cause, and this last another cause and so on to infinity' (*Ethics*, xviii, 48) All thoughts and perceptions are only consequences of our preced thoughts and perceptions An omniscient intellect, grasp the world in its totality as a single fact, finds it determin from top to bottom If this is denied science is impossibl The theory of free-will is not consistent with the law of causat which is not defeated anywhere If ethics is to be regarded a science, no irrational surd should be introduced in the sh of free-will In the interests of theory, some critics have j pounded an illogical antithesis between 'truth of life' (free-v and 'truth of science' (determination) But it is a mista distinction, since the function of philosophical science is comprehend the facts of life under ideal schemes If freedom regarded as a postulate in the moral sphere, even then, its cl to be an ultimate category of reality is not established methodological assumption is strictly relative to its explanat value Once it fulfils that, it has no claim beyond As su freedom of the will is only a practical postulate, a work hypothesis and does not bear the stamp of final irrefutabil On this view, freedom may be admitted as a practical postu without assuming its ultimate validity All this difficulty is to the fact that most ethical writers regard freedom as the v basis of ethics, while in fact, real freedom is above all de minations There is no point in talking of partial freedom si it is only an expression that marks the limits of our knowle of the necessity implied in any case Either man is free or is not If he is free, he is absolutely free If he is not, h thoroughly determined. The empirical man can never be f

The transcendental is always free and has no need for such concepts. Since freedom is practically useful and socially needed, the consciousness of freedom settled down in the human race. Its final solution is a wager on the side of ethics. All views of freedom are steeped in ego-centricism. Human beings cannot create anything including themselves, their thoughts and goals. They only select out of a total that has already been given or combine elements in such a way, that powers beyond their control will create something new. This we mistake to be freedom, while in fact, the world is sliding on its own keel from eternity to eternity. The Persian Poet is right when he sang 'The first dawn of creation saw the last day of reckoning'. If any one can say what set the first atom in motion, he knows all about freedom. That first act was a free act and the rest followed it simply through the compelling force of its own eternal nature.

2. To reinforce the type of argument he is upholding, Hartmann appeals to the consciousness of freedom and the sense of guilt as witnesses to the freedom of will. But, neither consciousness of freedom nor sense of guilt establishes this alleged freedom. Side by side with the consciousness of freedom there is a consciousness of inevitability in human affairs. Fatalism is as natural a mood of the mind as the free-will mood. It is as easy to believe that I have spoiled myself, as to believe that all through my life I have been resisting in vain a force that was constantly making me a fool. 'Luck', 'destiny' and 'fate' are some of the expressions that confess a failure to know in full the mysteries of the Divine nature. The need for grace is everywhere manifest. How many of us have not felt that in the most fundamental events of our life, we took but little part? We often feel that there is a 'divinity that shapes our ends'. This is as real a feeling as the feeling of personal responsibility. Hartmann has failed to notice it. It is a well-known fact that some people do not have the sense of guilt, though they deserve to have it, while others who do not deserve it, have it and suffer from it. Thus a novice stepping into a crime club for the first time sees the judgment of heaven directly brooding over him, while an expert in the line knows how to rate these feelings. While most Christians break down under the sense of sin, most philosophers sin their way to Jesus. The fact is, sense of guilt

is only a fear of vengeance, the tremour at the thought of the day of doom. The more keenly we are afflicted with it, the more irrevocable it appears. It is one of the agents of righteous retribution which is writ large throughout the moral cosmos. We are certainly never out of the shadow of destiny. The words of an Æschylus or Sophocles ring true even to this day when we begin to realise the conflicts into which most of us are drawn without our consent. A fine philosopher will have no regrets. And as far as it is within his reach he does always the best under the circumstances and keeps good cheer, by resigning himself to the master power, which no wisdom can displace or doubt deny. Hartmann makes the sense of guilt the ethical equivalent of Sin. It is perfectly possible to imagine a man without the sense of guilt though he may do guilty things. If in this case his freedom from sense of guilt does not disprove freedom of the will, sense of guilt too cannot prove the freedom of the will. Cases can be easily cited from abnormal psychology which clearly show that there is no necessary connection between an act and the sort of consciousness that precedes or follows that act.

3 Hartmann throws the final burden of proof for freedom on personality. Moral life cannot be reduced to the life of God or nature. Intellectualism sacrifices the freedom of the will for the completeness of its speculative view. The denial of individual freedom is a logical necessity of thought. But to the moralist, personality is the highest concept. In Hartmann's view, Kant committed a mistake by making absolute the distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal self. By so doing he gave us only an empty and unreal freedom. He saw no case for freedom, except by removing the ethical self out of the empirical sphere in which there is only necessity. Since knowledge is only of the phenomenal and not of the noumenal or essential, it can never solve such an ultimate problem as that of freedom. On the Kantian view man is noumenally free and empirically determined. This is, as one critic aptly remarked, 'freedom outside the prison house'. Such freedom is illusory. Man is free only in so far as he acts rationally. Good alone, thus, can be the product of freedom and evil of necessity. But as Hartmann has pointed out, freedom, to have moral significance, must be freedom in choosing the evil equally with the

good. Freedom as he says is the very power which makes evil evil and good good. By the removal of freedom from the domain of nature and mechanism to a rational realm of its own, he has reduced it to a transcendental abstraction. Hartmann upholds the integrity of personality to cover the rifts in the Kantian system. In a word, he merged the empirical and the transcendental selves in his own concept of ethical personality and asserted that freedom belongs to it. His line of argument falls away when once we prove personality has no ultimate value or validity. Logically, personality has no scope as an ultimate principle. If all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, the empirical ego as an empirical ego has no metaphysical truth about it and as such must be regarded only as an appearance. In the words of Bradley, ultimate reality is impersonal. 'But then the soul, I must repeat, is itself not an ultimate fact. It is appearance, and any description of it must contain inconsistency' (*Appearance and Reality*, pp. 414-5). As moral life is governed by two incompatible ideas (see my note on moral antinomies) that of self-assertion and self-sacrifice, the individual never can in himself become an harmonious system. 'Now that this divergence ceases and is brought together in the end is most certain. For nothing is outside the Absolute.' Morality is no finality as the moral experience is never free from final antinomies. Moral life as Bradley put it is governed by two 'incompatible ideals' that of 'self-assertion' and 'self-sacrifice'. 'To reduce the raw material of one's nature to the higher degree of system and to use every element from whatever source as a subordinate means to this object, is certainly one genuine view of goodness. On the other hand to widen as far as possible the end to be pursued and to realise this through this distraction or dissipation of one's individuality is certainly also good. An individual system aimed at in one's self, and again the subordination of one's own development to a wide embracing end are each an aspect of the moral principle. . . And however much these must diverge, each is morally good; and taken in the abstract you cannot say that one is better than the other' (pp. 114-115). 'Now that this divergence ceases, and is brought together in the end is most certain. For nothing is outside the absolute, and in the absolute there is nothing imperfect. . . In the absolute everything finite attains the

satisfaction which it seeks but upon the other hand, it cannot gain perfection precisely as it seeks it For the finest is more or less transcended and as such, disappears in being accomplished The common destiny is assured by the end of the good The ends suggested by self-assertion and self-sacrifice are, each alike unattainable The individual never can in himself become an harmonious system And in the wider ideal to which he directs himself no matter how thoroughly, he can never find complete self-realisation And, in the complete gift and dissipation of his personality he, as such, must vanish, and with that the good is, as such transcended and submerged' (p 419) Then free-will also which is a mask of human personality, *ipso facto* falls away This higher necessity of logical thought is the only freedom left to man and he is free in so far as he is identical with God and the realisation he has of this fact Goodness and badness alike are appearances and, being phenomenal, are self-contradictory Such distinctions are 'entia Imaginationis' as Spinoza expresses it They are the results of partial knowledge and have no meaning from a strictly metaphysical point of view This is not, as Hartmann may object, depersonalising or demoralising man We are only pressing the need for transcending inadequate categories Since moral personality is not ultimate, the freedom which is its prop must go down along with it Thereby, one need not fear that moral life is annulled On the other hand, it takes on a higher significance in an experience which dissolves its discords and transcends all values as the supremest value











